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This paper takes an institutional perspective to study the roles of institutional change 
and continuity in shaping Chinese enterprises’ labor flexibility strategies. Based on 
intensive field research in seven construction machinery enterprises, I find that 
employment practices in these workplaces are converging toward extremely 
numerical flexibility including the use of temporary labor, short-term labor contracts, 
termination of labor relationships, internal retrenchment and flexible working time. I 
argue that both institutional change and continuity have played important roles in 
shaping these labor flexibility practices. On the one hand, the changing household 
registration system, the changing social protection system, the establishment of the 
labor contract system, the weakening workers’ representation in the workplace, and 
the ambiguous labor regulations and weak enforcement have directly provided 
pre-conditions for the spread of extreme numerical flexibility practices in the Chinese 
workplace. On the other hand, the continuity of other institutions including the 
macroeconomic control of the state, the underdeveloped business credit system, the 
cultural preference of extremely short lead time, and the vocational education and 
training system has indirectly imposed imperatives of extreme numerical flexibility on 
these enterprises by increasing uncertainties and fluctuations of product markets and 
worsening the labor market condition of excess low skilled and scarce high skilled 
labor. 
Introduction 
Social, economic, and political changes in the past three decades have dramatically 
transformed the workplaces in advanced industrial nations (e.g. Appelbaum and Batt, 1994; 
Katz and Darbishire 2000; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986; Locke 1996; Locke, Kochan, 
and Piore 1995; Streeck 1988; Swenson 1989, and Wood 1989). In particular, flexibility has 
become a new frontier of managing work and employment (e.g. Cappelli and Neumark 2004; 
Atkinson 1984; Atkinson and Nigel 1986; Grenier, Giles, and Belanger 1997; Lorenz 1992; 
Osterman 1994; Penn, Lilja, and Scattergood 1992; and Pinfield and Atkinson 1988).1 To 
adapt quickly to rapid developments in technology, greater diversity in labor markets, and 
increasing international competition in product markets, firms have developed two primary 
flexibility strategies: numerical (or external) flexibility that aims at reducing costs by 
adjusting the quantity or volume of labor, and functional (or internal) flexibility that aims at 
improving performance by enhancing employees’ ability to perform a variety of jobs and 
participate in decision-making (Atkinson 1984; OECD 1986). While numerical flexibility 
includes the use of temporary and contract labor, subcontracting, short-term contracts, layoffs, 
retrenchment, shift working, variable working time, and other practices which reduce 
employment security and the number of workers, functional flexibility usually involves 
teamwork, job rotation, multiskilling, work in multi-tasks and multi-sites, and pay for 
performance.2 Although the exact relationship between the two flexibility strategies is still 
not clear (Cappelli and Neumark 2004; Kalleberg 2001), many studies suggest that firms are 
                                                        
1 Flexibility can be defined in very different ways and at different levels. In this paper I focus on labor 
flexibility at the level of firm or establishment.  
2 Some researchers suggest financial or wage flexibility as the third type of flexibility (e.g. Atkinson 1984). 
However, this paper follows Kuruvilla and Erickson’s (2002) perspective that views the use of pay as a key 
component of functional flexibility.  
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often simultaneously seeking for both of the flexibilities especially when their employees are 
divided into different groups (e.g. Cully et al. 1999; Grenier et al. 1997; Kalleberg 2003; 
Pinfield and Atkinson 1988; Streeck 1988; and Voudouris 2007). Yet, functional flexibility 
which shares characteristics with high performance work systems, seems to have gained more 
currency in the Western workplaces since the 1990s (e.g. Appelbaum and Batt, 1994; 
Applebaum et al. 2000; Godard and Delaney 2000; MacDuffie 1995; Osterman 1994, 2000; 
and Wood 1999).  
The search for flexibility has spread to workplaces in developing countries in Asia (e.g. 
Kuruvilla and Erickson 2002), Latin America (e.g. Cook 1998), and Africa (e.g. Horwitz 
1995). According to the renewed convergence hypothesis, powerful forces of globalization 
and international competition are driving employment practices all over the world converging 
toward international “best practices”(e.g. Kochan, Lansbury and MacDuffie 1997; Krugman, 
1996; Streeck, 1997; Womack, Jones and Roos 1990). The divergence approach, however, 
argues that deep-rooted differences in country’s institutional arrangements lead to varied 
effects of globalization across countries which makes world-wide convergence of 
employment practices unlikely (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001; Whitley 2000).  
Both of the perspectives have been taken in the study of the changing Chinese 
workplace. China’s increasing integration into the global economy, the rapid growth of 
foreign direct investment, and the diffusing role of multinational companies make some 
researchers believe that there is a trend of convergence in terms of employment practices in 
the Chinese workplace, although they often disagree on the extent or direction of such 
convergence (e.g. Benson and Zhu 1999; Björkman 2002; Chan 1995a; Chile and Tse 2001; 
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Cooke 2005a; Gallagher 2005; Kuruvilla and Erickson 2002; Warner 1996, 2000, 2003). 
Some researchers, however, are more cautious about the convergence thesis highlighting the 
great variance of employment patterns in different regions, industrial sectors, and companies 
with different ownerships (e.g. Chan 1995b; Ding, Goodall, and Warner 2000; Taylor 1999). 
In particular, whether or not ownership boundaries of employment practices are disappearing 
has become the focus of the debate (e.g. Ding et al. 2000; Gallagher 2005; Gong and Chang 
2008; Law, Tse, and Zhou. 2003; Wang, Bruning, and Peng 2007; Zhu and Dowling, 2002; 
Zhu et al. 2005).  
Yet, most of the convergence/divergence debate in China focuses on Western standard 
human resource policies and practices, while lacking systematical examination of labor 
flexibility in the workplace. Nonetheless, the existing studies do suggest that the Chinese 
workplace is becoming more flexible (e.g. Benson et al. 2000; Bodmer 2002; Chen 2001; 
Kuruvilla and Erickson 2002), but the focus seems to be on cost-based rather than 
value-added strategy (e.g. Benson et al. 2000; Chen 2001; Zhao and Nichols 1996). My field 
research in China in the past three years finds that there is widespread adoption of extreme 
numerical flexibility by different types of Chinese enterprises, while the diffusion of 
functional flexibility is in a piecemeal manner and much slower. The selective (or sequential) 
adoption of numerical flexibility over functional flexibility instead of complete convergence 
toward the international “best practices” (i.e. both numerical and functional flexibility), 
according to Kuruvilla and Erickson (2002), is due to the nature of the development of 
competitive advantage. Since presently competitive advantage of Chinese enterprises is 
mainly based on low costs, numerical flexibility thus tends to predominate. This strategic 
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perspective seems valid, but it tends to overlook significant constraints imposed by 
institutions and markets that may hinder or enhance different types of flexibility. For instance, 
powerful industrial relations institutions (such as labor law and trade unions) may prevent the 
use of many numerical flexibility practices; and increasing uncertainty and fluctuation of 
product markets may force companies that compete on the basis of high quality, productivity, 
and skills to adopt numerical flexibility practices such as layoffs and the use of contract labor.   
This chapter therefore takes an institutional perspective to study the roles of institutional 
change and continuity in shaping Chinese enterprises’ labor flexibility strategies. Through 
institutional lens the roles of markets are also examined.3 Institutionalists usually emphasize 
difficulty or slowness of institution change, with an implicit assumption of the existence of a 
democratic polity in which policy decisions are the result of negotiations among a multitude 
of diverse actors pursuing specific vested interests. However, China maintains the communist 
authoritarian regime, in which the complex and unpredictable political process is not 
considered in institutional analyses in the West. In fact China’s market transition under the 
leadership of the Party-state has led to both rapid changes of some institutions and continuity 
of others. Based on my field research, I argue that both institutional change and continuity 
have played important roles in “selecting” numerical over functional flexibility. On the one 
hand, the changing household registration system, the changing social protection system, the 
establishment of the labor contract system, the weakening workers’ representation in the 
workplace, and the ambiguous labor regulations and weak enforcement have directly 
provided pre-conditions for the spread of extreme numerical flexibility practices in the 
                                                        
3 Following Whitley (1992, 2000), culture preferences and beliefs are viewed as institutions in this paper.  
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Chinese workplace. On the other hand, the continuity of other institutions including the 
macroeconomic control of the state, the underdeveloped business credit system, the cultural 
preference of extremely short lead time, and the vocational education and training system has 
indirectly imposed imperatives of extreme numerical flexibility on Chinese enterprises by 
increasing uncertainties and fluctuations of product markets and worsening the labor market 
condition of excess low skilled and scarce high skilled labor.    
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, with empirical 
evidence of “selective” convergence of employment practices toward numerical flexibility 
with Chinese characteristics, this study calls for a more nuanced analysis of convergence. 
Due to various institutional constraints, partial rather than complete convergence toward 
international “best practices” seems more likely. Second, the literature of varieties of 
capitalism mainly focuses on advanced industrial nations while little research has been done 
in transitioning and developing economies. This study, by examining the impacts of Chinese 
institutions on employment practices, extends the analyses of varieties of capitalism to a 
statist market economy which is significantly different from the models set forth by Hall and 
Soskice (2001) and Amable (2003). Finally, this study also contributes to the 
above-mentioned ownership debate in the field of Chinese industrial relations and human 
resource management. By comparing employment practices in the theoretically sampled 
enterprises, this paper suggests that ownership differences are gradually disappearing at least 
in terms of numerical flexibility.  
Research Methodology 
This study is based on my field research in the summer of 2006 and 2007 in seven 
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enterprises in the construction machinery industry in Xuzhou, Jiangsu province. Xuzhou is a 
medium sized industrial city with GDP per capita US $2,528 in 2007, 24.3% and 29.4% of 
that of Shenzhen and Shanghai respectively.4 While most studies have been conducted in 
Shanghai, Shenzhen, or other coast cities, focusing on a second-tier city may better reveal the 
extent of workplace changes in China.  
China’s construction machinery industry started from scratch in the 1950s and became a 
“free competition” heavy industry without entry barriers (which is different from the auto 
industry) in the 1990s. Sales revenue of this industry reached US $ 30 billion in 2007, 
ranking the second place in the world just after the United States. By the end of 2005, there 
were about 2,000 enterprises (10% are foreign invested) in this industry with total 
employment of 330,000 workers.5 Most of these enterprises concentrate in six construction 
machinery industrial districts, among which Xuzhou is the largest one.6 Presently there are 
over 100 construction machinery enterprises in Xuzhou, including state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), private-owned enterprises (POEs), international joint ventures (IJVs), and wholly 
foreign-invested enterprises (WFIEs). All construction machinery enterprises in Xuzhou were 
state- or collective-owned and affiliated to Xuzhou Machinery Industry Bureau in the 
command economy. With the progress of enterprise reform, some surviving enterprises have 
gained complete autonomy through privatization. Others, although still affiliated to a state 
group company established in 1989 (which takes many functions of the former local 
machinery industry bureau), have gained high operational, financial, and personnel autonomy 
                                                        
4 Calculations were based on the data from Statistical Bureaus of Xuzhou, Shenzhen, and Shanghai.  
5 Source: China Construction Machinery Industry Association (CCMIA).  
6 Total sales revenue of construction machinery enterprises in Xuzhou accounted for one third of that of the 
whole national industry in 2005.  
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through various corporate restructuring.7 There are also some newly established construction 
machinery enterprises in Xuzhou, but the majority of them are very small POEs producing 
parts and components.  
The seven enterprises chosen for this study are among the largest ones in the local 
construction machinery industry. A, B, and D even capture the largest national market shares 
of their major products respectively. Workers in these enterprises are often envied by the 
local people given their relatively high and stable salary. Six of these enterprises have both 
parts and final assembly sub-plants while E only produces parts and components. A, C, D, 
and E were founded in the early days of socialist industrialization, while B, F, and G have a 
much shorter history. The ownerships of these enterprises vary, including two SOEs, two 
listed SOEs, a Sino-US joint venture, a wholly German-owned enterprise, and a POE (see 
table 1 for the profiles of these enterprises). This sampling method allows a better 
examination of the effect of ownership on employment practices since industry and location 
factors are largely controlled.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Each case study involved interviews with the general and/or vice-general manager, 
managers of all functional departments (including human resource, manufacturing, 
technology, marketing, purchasing, quality control, and finance) and sub-plants/workshops, 
and union chairman and/or vice-chairman, shopfloor visits and informal talks with front-line 
workers, collection of enterprise documents and data, and surveys on workers’ perceived 
                                                        
7 For details about China’s state group companies see e.g. Ma and Lu (2005) and Sutherland (2003).  
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employment practices and evaluation of their trade unions.8 The surveys were done in a way 
similar to structured interviews. In each enterprise, I randomly chose workers from the 
employee list of the assembly sub-plant/workshop (the number of selected workers ranged 
from 22 to 56) and asked the manager to call in these workers to a conference room to fill in 
the questionnaires during working time.9 To ensure the quality of the survey, I asked the 
manager to leave the room, assured the workers complete confidentiality of their answers, 
explained the survey questions, and provided small cash rewards to some workers randomly 
chosen from those who had answered all the questions. In total I conducted over 90 
interviews and received 264 usable survey questionnaires.  
The Changing Employment Practices in the Chinese Industrial Workplace: Evidence 
from Case-Study Enterprises 
    Industrial production in China from the mid-1950s to the early 1990s was dominated by 
SOEs, which was not organized to make profits, but to fulfill the economic and social policy 
of the state (Walder 1986). The Chinese socialist employment system, characterized by the 
so-called “iron rice bowl” (tie fan wan), was rigid and inflexible resulting in dramatic 
over-manning, low work morale, and poor performance in most SOEs (Child 1994; Korzec 
1992; Takahara 1992; Walder 1986). Employees were allocated to their work units (danwei) 
by local labor bureaus according to state plan, after which they usually enjoyed lifetime 
employment and cradle-to-grave welfare (Child 1994: Ding and Warner 2001; Walder 1986; 
Warner 1987, 1995). Dismissals which required permissions of local industrial bureaus were 
                                                        
8 The surveys used in this paper were a part of larger surveys which involved both workers and engineers, and 
had additional questions regarding organizational trust and commitment, turnover intention, discretionary 
behavior, etc.. 
9 The workers surveyed in E were from parts assembly lines.  
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rare; and often due to criminal behavior or political dissidence rather than poor work 
performance. Layoffs did occur, but only in rare cases of enterprise disbandment or 
temporary closure (Walder 1986: 72-3). Labor mobility between enterprises and regions was 
uncommon too, hindered by numerous institutional barriers, for example, the household 
registration (hukou) system that only permitted workers to be permanently employed in their 
area of residence (Walder 1986: 69-71). For various reasons, however, temporary workers 
were used but mainly in public works projects, construction, and road-building (for details 
see Walder 1986: 49-54). In manufacturing enterprises, as several managers in A, C, and D 
recalled, there were only a very small number of temporary workers engaging in heavy labor 
such as construction work and moving and hauling. Occasionally, workers also needed to 
work overtime (with no extra pay or very small supplements) especially during production 
campaigns. However, according to some old workers I interviewed, workers often 
volunteered to work overtime to either fulfill their political responsibility or to become 
activists or “model workers”. This is consistent with Walder’s (1986: 149) findings. In 
general, enterprises did not have the autonomy to hire or fire workers, nor did they force 
workers to work overtime. Thus, although temporary workers, layoffs, and overtime existed 
before the economic reform, numerically flexibility in the Chinese workplace was extremely 
limited.   
Chinese enterprises also significantly lacked functional flexibility in the pre-reform era. 
Wage systems in Chinese industries were directly administered by the central government 
that set the general wage policies and determined both the wage structure and differentials. 
Although piece rates and bonus systems were widely adopted in the 1950s (Takahara 1992; 
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Walder 1986), they were criticized as “anti-socialist” in political campaigns and abolished 
during the Cultural Revolution of 1967-1977 (Yuan 1990). Thus, the formal link between 
wages, individual performance, and enterprise profitability was largely missing in the 
Chinese workplace when the economic reform launched in 1978. Yet, enterprises did achieve 
certain functional flexibility in terms of work organization through the work group 
(shengchan xiaozu) system, which “was not only a structural innovation, but also an attempt 
to develop a more effective means of motivating workers……” (Walder 1986: 111) A work 
group was the basic production unit in the Chinese workplace, which usually had no more 
than a dozen workers, led by a worker designated (by the workshop director and party branch 
secretary) as the group leader.10 The work group-based production used to involve a lot of 
communication, cooperation, and participation (especially through various production and 
discussion meetings), and require workers to perform a broad range of tasks including 
technical jobs, statistical reporting and accounting, routine inspection, and paper work 
(Walder 1986). According to some assembly sub-plant/workshop managers and old workers 
in A, C, D, and E, the assembly work before the 1990s, which was called “stall assembly” 
(ditanshi zhuangpei, literally translated), was done in a cooperative way by groups of workers. 
Although the efficiency was very low due to poor technology and equipments, workers could 
gain more skills through teamwork. However, for some reasons especially the abolishment of 
group bonus system during the Culture Revolution, work groups became dysfunctional and 
ineffective in the 1970s (for details see Walder 1986). The traditional socialist workplace also 
actively solicited workers’ participation through the “raising rational suggestions” (ti helihua 
                                                        
10 Production in the Chinese industrial workplace was usually organized at three levels: workshop, work section 
(gongduan), and work group.   
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jianyi) system. Yet, due to the problems of nonmaterial incentives, the participation practices 
were characterized by strong formalism (Chan 1997).  
The traditional Chinese industrial workplace has dramatically changed since the 
economic reform. As to the case-study enterprises, the most striking change in terms of 
employment practices is the breakdown of the “iron rice bowl” system and following 
predominance of extreme numerical flexibility. The various numerical flexibility practices 
adopted by these enterprises are summarized in Table 2 and Table 3 and examined in detail in 
the following section. It should be noted that the employment data in Table 2 come from 
2006, which cannot reflect the large scale downsizing in the late 1990s and early 2000s; and 
that the data in Table 3 are based on interviews and surveys in the assembly 
sub-plants/workshops which, compared to other sub-plants/workshops in the same enterprises, 
have more advanced technology, equipments, and skilled workers, and adopt less numerical 
flexibility practices.  
Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here 
Use of Temporary Labor    Five different types of temporary labor were found in 
these enterprises. The first type was local peasant workers who were employed directly by 
the enterprises or sub-plants/workshops through the labor bureau, labor market, or internal 
recommendations. These workers engaged in a variety of jobs including heavy labor, 
auxiliary work, parts production, and assembly work. According to the labor law, their 
employment should also be based on contracts. However, while A, B, D, and E gave these 
workers three- or six-month contracts, C, F, and G did not sign labor contracts with them. 
Interestingly, such practice was not allowed in C according to its formal employment policy, 
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but widely found in its sub-plants where the managers had the autonomy to directly hire these 
workers. In a sub-plant of C, such workers even accounted for over half of its total workforce. 
Compared to formal contract workers, these temporary workers were usually given lower 
wages, reduced benefits and social insurance, or no benefits and insurance at all if they did 
not have labor contracts.  
The second type was dispatched labor (including both peasant and urban workers) hired 
by these enterprises through labor service companies (which signed contracts with the 
workers). These dispatched workers often worked in the front-line, but received much lower 
wages. Although reduced social insurance was paid by the enterprises to the labor service 
companies, the latter seldom gave it to the workers.11  
The third type was apprenticeship labor, i.e. young graduates of technical schools (the 
majority of which were from rural area) who entered these enterprises after graduation, 
worked in the shopfloor without labor contracts, and received reduced wages or only basic 
living allowance.12 Although the labor law states that apprentice period should be no more 
than six months, the actual apprenticeship in all of these enterprises was at least one year. In 
C and F many workers had worked as apprenticeship labor for two or three years. Even worse, 
because receiving a labor contract is not legally required once apprenticeship ends, technical 
school graduates were in fact employed “at will” and to some extent “recycled” by these 
enterprises.  
The fourth type was interns from technical schools who were still students in status. 
                                                        
11 Interviews with HR managers of the seven enterprises. The fact was well known by all of them.  
12 Apprenticeship workers were used in SOEs before the economic reform, see Frazier (2002: 198) and Walder 
(1986). However, apprenticeship was required only for unskilled labor. Graduates of technical schools were 
guaranteed employment in SOEs and did not need to go through the apprentice period (Walder 1986: 58-9).  
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Because practical skill training was far from enough in the technical schools, students wanted 
to learn skills in factories and gain some working experience. Technical schools also 
encouraged students to intern, and often assigned students to enterprises under their requests. 
The normal internship was one year, although it could be shorter. These interns usually 
worked as assistants of their “mentors”, doing some auxiliary work. Because no pay was 
required for these interns, only several sub-plants/workshops in these enterprises paid a small 
amount of subsidiaries to them (about US$ 1.25 per work day). According to a sub-plant 
manager in C, “although they do not have enough skills to work independently, we really 
need them especially in peak seasons……and we do not need to pay them.”  
The last category of temporary labor was external, i.e. workers in small subcontracting 
enterprises or special service companies. All of the seven enterprises subcontracted some 
services such as security, cleaning, and dining to special service companies. They also 
subcontracted some parts production or work processes to small POEs (many of them had 
less than 30 workers) in which labor costs were much lower due to the prevalence of various 
illegal employment practices. Yet given different enterprise sizes, the number of 
subcontractors varied ranging from fifty to over two hundred. In addition, while most 
subcontracting was permanent, some was temporary, i.e. only in peak seasons.  
The five types of temporary workers were found in all the enterprises, although the 
percentage of each category differed across enterprises and even sub-plants/workshops. Table 
3 shows that the first two types of temporary labor did not exist in the assembly sub-plants of 
A, B, and D, but they were found in other sub-plants of these enterprises. The wide use of 
technical school graduates/students as extremely low-paid or even free temporary workers is 
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particularly worth noting. All the enterprises viewed technical school graduates/students as an 
important reserve of cheap, disciplined, and well-trained (compared to unskilled peasant 
workers) temporary labor. They had close relationships with local technical schools, and 
could always get the graduates/students when they were needed.13 The technical school 
graduates/students in the assembly workshop of G, a relatively new POE, even accounted for 
60.2% of the total workforce.  
Short-Term Contracts    Instead of life-time employment, all formal staff and workers 
in these enterprises were employed on a contractual basis which made dismissals much easier. 
Although a few senior employees and core technical talents were given ten-year or 
open-ended contracts, short-term (equal or less than three years) contracts were widely used 
in these enterprises especially for production workers. Table 3 shows that except for B and D, 
all the other enterprises gave over half of their assembly workers short-term contracts. F, a 
German-owned enterprise, even signed short-term contracts with almost all its assembly 
workers. The contracts for new workers were even shorter, usually one year in all the 
enterprises. Managerial positions, however, usually had three-year or five-year labor 
contracts, which, although a little longer than workers’ contracts, could also be terminated 
due to their poor performance or enterprise restructuring.  
Termination of Labor Relationships    Termination of labor relationships in these 
enterprises had three categories. The first was enterprise-proposed termination before the 
labor contracts expired (i.e. dismissal). Although a very small number of workers fell into 
this category each year due to criminal behavior or extremely poor performance, these 
                                                        
13 Interviews with HR managers of these enterprises.  
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enterprises especially the SOEs were often reluctant to do so for various reasons such as the 
socialist tradition, possible labor disputes and conflicts, workers’ petition to the government, 
and even personal harassment or attack.14 However, large scale dismissals did happen when 
the enterprises faced sharply declined market demands and financial losses. For instance, 
both E and G dismissed over 200 workers in 2004 due to poor economic performance.15 
While it was still not very common to dismiss workers in these enterprises, managers were 
able to wash out the workers whom they did not want by choosing another two ways to 
terminate workers’ labor relationships. One was “forced” employee-proposed termination 
before the labor contracts expired, which was found in the four SOEs. Through enterprise 
restructuring, the “re-application for posts on a competitive basis” (jingzheng shanggang) 
system, and the “elimination of the last” (mowei taotai) system, redundant or poorly 
performing workers were transferred to the enterprise labor pools waiting for posts.16 If they 
could not find a position within six months or they could not fit the new position (usually 
related to heavy labor or unhealthy jobs) offered by the enterprises, the enterprises had the 
“right’ to dismiss them according to internal policies. Worrying that they might be 
compensated less if they were dismissed, these workers often chose to “voluntarily” 
terminate their labor contracts to get better negotiated compensation. Voluntary turnover also 
fell into the category of employee-proposed termination. But it was usually chosen by a few 
                                                        
14 Interviews with HR managers of these enterprises. After dismissed, workers in POEs, IJVs, and FIEs often 
filed labor lawsuits while workers in SOEs often visited or wrote letters to the government to complain or 
harassed or even violently attacked the managers. 
15 Interviews with the HR managers of E and G.  
16 The “re-application for posts on a competitive basis” system and the “elimination of the last” system were 
adopted by the four SOEs for the purposes of downsizing and pushing employees to work hard. While the 
former mainly applied to managerial positions, the primary target of the latter was production workers.  
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managers, engineers, and high skilled workers, the majority production workers wanted to 
stay rather than leave their enterprises.17 The other type of termination of labor relationships 
was natural termination (i.e. expiration or the emergence of the conditions for the termination 
as agreed upon by the parties involved in the contract) of labor contracts without renewal, 
which was commonly used by all of the enterprises. Short-term contracts further facilitated 
this practice. Table 2 shows the percentages of employees in these enterprises whose labor 
contracts were terminated in 2006 (the data provided by the enterprises did not distinguish 
different types of termination). The four SOEs had much lower termination rates, which 
reflected the remaining constraints in SOEs on firing workers.18  
Internal Retrenchment    Since radical downsizing (i.e. termination of labor 
relationships) was not easy for the four SOEs, they turned to various internal retrenchment 
practices to get out of redundant and poorly performing workers. The large-scale internal 
labor retrenchment in these SOEs started in the late 1990s and ended in the early 2000s. 
While some internal retrenchment practices in the 1990s such as “stop salary, keep post” 
(tingxin liuzhi), “don’t call us and we won’t call you” (liang bu zhao, loosely translated), and 
“leave post, keep labor relationships” (ligang guabian) either discontinued or were not 
allowed anymore when this study was done during 2006-2007, others remained or changed 
forms.19 In addition, the scale of internal retrenchment was still striking in the SOEs, albeit 
                                                        
17 According to HR managers of these enterprises, the voluntary turnover rates were very low, usually less than 
3%. My survey also showed that the average turnover intention of assembly workers in these enterprises was 
3.39/7, and only 6.9% showed clear turnover intention (the score was equal or higher than 5/7).    
18 It is less possible that the lower termination rates in the SOEs were due to lower voluntary turnover rates 
since the latter was lower than 3% in all of the enterprises.  
19 For details of the internal retrenchment practices in the 1990s see Gallagher (2005: 72-3) and Hassard, Morris, 
Sheehan, and Xiao (2006).  
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not as much as several years ago. The employment data provided by these enterprises (see 
table 2) indicated three categories of workers who were “off-post” (ligang) but kept their 
labor relationships with these enterprises: layoffs (xiagang), employees waiting for posts in 
the enterprise labor pool (laodongli zhongxin daigang), and early or internal retirement 
(neibu tuiyang, or neitui). From 1998 to 2005, a large number of elderly and low skilled 
workers in the four SOEs were laid off, receiving a small amount of monthly living 
allowance from the enterprises. However, by 2006 most of them had either changed their 
status to retirement or were forced to terminate their labor relationships with these enterprises 
(certain compensation were paid). Moreover, the layoff policy was officially abandoned in 
China in 2006. Therefore, the percentages of accumulated layoffs in these SOEs shown in 
Table 2 were small. However, significant percentages of production workers in these 
enterprises had laid-off experience. As indicated in Table 3, except for D which was very 
profitable from 1998 to 2003, the percentages of assembly workers who had experienced 
laid-off in the other six enterprises ranged from 2.3% to 38.7%.20  
While layoff “disappeared”, the four SOEs adopted an alternative form i.e. waiting for 
posts in the enterprise labor pool. Redundant or poorly performing employees were required 
to leave their positions and register in the enterprise labor pool receiving a small amount of 
living allowance. The enterprises regularly provided these employees training in some skills 
that were needed and redeployed them to new positions (often related with heavy labor or 
unhealthy operations). Alternatively, these employees could apply for vacancies within their 
enterprises on their own. If no positions were found within six months, these employees 
                                                        
20 Workers in E, F, and G experienced laid-off because these enterprises were or had been joint ventures or 
SOEs.  
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would be dismissed. In 2006, C and D had 1.4% and 3.4% of their employees in the labor 
pools respectively (see table 2). A and B, however, due to increasing product market 
demands and profits, did not have workers entering the labor pools.  
Another widely used internal retrenchment practice was early retirement, which was 
firstly introduced in China in 1993. According to the policy of these enterprises, female 
employees over 40 years old and male employees over 45 years old could apply for early 
retirement; and reduced wages (in some cases lower than the local minimum wage) and social 
insurances were paid for early retirees until formal retirement.21 The age limitation had 
become stricter in recent years (because the former policy was contradictory to the national 
regulation, which will be further discussed later): only employees who would reach the 
formal retirement age (50 for female workers, 55 for female staff, and 60 for male employees) 
within five years or who had worked over 30 years were eligible for early retirement. While a 
few employees voluntarily chose early retirement for some reasons such as they could make 
more money by taking other jobs or opening their own businesses, and they really wanted to 
have a rest due to health problems, most early retirees were in fact “induced” or “threatened” 
by the enterprises.22 Table 2 shows that except for F, all the other six enterprises had certain 
percentages of early retirees, ranging from 2.3% to 36.4%.  
It is worth noting that in these enterprises managerial and administrative staff had 
become more vulnerable to internal retrenchment than workers in recent years. In the summer 
                                                        
21 If employees really wanted early retirement, the age limitation could even be loosed, for example, through 
sick retirement (bingtui).  
22 This was admitted by HR managers of B, C, and D. In a few cases, lump sum compensations (usually 
between US$1,250 and 2,500) were paid as an “inducement”. In most cases, however, many employees 
reluctantly retired early due to their fear of dismissals.  
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of 2007, both C and D downsized over 150 managerial and administrative staff (some 
workers in D were also retrenched, but less than managerial staff) through early retirement 
and waiting for posts in the labor pools. Failing to secure his position through “re-application 
for posts on a competitive basis”, the HR manager of C was also retrenched to the labor pool 
which had been under his leadership, though he got a managerial job in a POE very soon.  
Flexible Working Time    Perhaps the most salient numerical flexibility practice in the 
seven enterprises was flexible working time, which included shift work, overtime, job sharing, 
and working in reduced time. Table 3 indicates the prevalence of shift work in these 
enterprises. While shift work (lunbanzhi) was not new, two shifts work that better allowed 
overtime had replaced three shifts in these enterprises. Further, overtime had become routine. 
The labor law regulates that overtime cannot exceed 36 hours per month. However, as 
indicated in Table 3, assembly workers’ average monthly overtime in the past year was more 
than 36 hours in all of the enterprises except for D which had excess production capacity due 
to the shrinking market demands. The average overtime in peak seasons was more shocking, 
reaching 99.6 hours per month in B and 110.3 hours per month in C. Even in D, the average 
overtime in peak seasons was much more than the upper limit stated by the labor law. Due to 
rapid increasing market demands for products of A, B, and F, many workers there had 
worked two shifts (8am to 8pm and 8pm to 8am respectively) without weekends for over a 
year. Managerial staff also worked overtime, although not as much as production workers. In 
A, B, C, D, and F, middle and top level management were required to work six days and six 
and a half days a week respectively. Even worse, overtime were not paid in A, B, C, D, and F. 
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Instead, workers were given more rest days in slack seasons to compensate.23 Yet, still many 
overtime hours were not compensated in this way. In particular, A and B had not experienced 
slack seasons in recent years. Although workers there made more money through the piece 
rate system, they were too exhausted and did not have time to spend money.24 E and F, 
however, did pay overtime after deducting extra rest hours in slack seasons, which indicated 
that Western IJVs and WFIEs did better in implementing the labor law than Chinese domestic 
enterprises. While workers worked overtime when market demands were high, they shared 
jobs and worked in reduced time in slack seasons. Significant percentages of workers had 
experience of job sharing and working in reduced time in all of the enterprises as shown in 
Table 3. Wages were reduced when workers worked less time, but the local minimum wage 
was usually guaranteed in all of the enterprises.25 However, according to some sub-plant 
managers, such “generous” guarantee in fact came from workers’ salaries in peak seasons, a 
part of which were withheld to pay workers in slack seasons.  
In sum, extreme numerical flexibility was prevalent in these case-study enterprises. 
Although it is not surprising that the two listed SOEs did not differ from the two SOEs in 
employment practices, the convergence toward numerical flexibility in these enterprises 
indicates the blurring ownership boundaries. While the four SOEs still had difficulties in 
firing workers, various internal retrenchment practices were adopted to streamline these 
enterprises. For instance, only 0.4% of employees in D were terminated labor relationships in 
                                                        
23 With the permission of local labor bureaus, enterprises can calculate workers’ working time on a whole year 
base, which is so-called “integratively calculating working time” (zonghe jisuan gongshi).  
24 In 2006 the average wages of A and B were US $ 441 and US $ 322 respectively, while the local average 
wage was US $228.  
25 From the payroll I found that some workers’ wages were lower than the local minimum wage due to various 
penalties.  
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2006, but 41.1% were downsized through layoffs, waiting for posts in the labor pool, and 
early retirement (see table 2). Compared to the non-state enterprises, B and C adopted even 
more aggressive overtime policies. Moreover, various types of temporary workers were used 
in all of the enterprises; and an illegal practice i.e. not signing labor contracts with temporary 
workers was found in three enterprises with different ownerships (i.e. C, F, and G). As the 
HR manager of F said: “Our employment policies were more flexible than SOEs’ in the 
1990s. But now there are almost no differences between SOEs and us.” (interview)26  
Compared to numerical flexibility, functional flexibility was much less popular in the 
case-study enterprises. First, as indicated in Table 4, teamwork was only adopted to some 
extent (such as on the line of new products) in the assembly sub-plant of A. In general the 
manufacturing managers and sub-plant/workshop managers in these enterprises believed that, 
given the nature of production (i.e. small batch, varieties of products) of this industry and 
workers’ skills, the most effective way to organize work was “fixed person, fixed post” 
(dingyuan dinggang), i.e. breaking assembly processes into separate tasks and attaching each 
worker to a specific task. Although work groups still existed in these enterprises, group 
members had distinct job classifications and seldom communicated and cooperated. Thus 
these work groups were different from the traditional ones that organized work on a 
collaborative basis. Such Taylorist work organization, argued by those managers, could 
minimize skill requirement, maximize the output of individual workers, and facilitate 
performance (i.e. production volumes and quality) appraisals.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
                                                        
26 In China when people especially HR managers talk about employment flexibility, they usually only refer to 
numerical flexibility.  
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Second, it is worth noting that quality circles (QC) or other off-line teams with the goal 
of improving product quality were adopted in all of the enterprises except for G. However, in 
the four SOEs, these were not new practices deliberately implemented to enhance flexibility, 
but extensions of their traditional practices of “raising rational suggestions”. Formalism 
remained for most participation practices except for the QC system, which copied the 
Japanese model and was widely introduced in SOEs in the early 1980s. In these SOEs, QC 
existed in each sub-plant and department; and some QC even won awards in the national QC 
competition. Given the cash rewards provided by the enterprises, workers especially skilled 
workers often actively participated in QC, which to certain extent enhanced functional 
flexibility. QC did not exit in E, F, and G. However, E had off-line teams and intensive 
“continuous improvement” programs introduced by the US parent company. Such off-line 
teams, however, were not common in F and did not exist in G (see Table 4). 
Third, since “fixed person, fixed post” was popular in these enterprises, job rotation with 
the goal of promoting multiskilling was only adopted to a limited extent in A and E. 
Nonetheless, all the enterprises had realized the benefits of having multi-skilled workers and 
thus encouraged workers to gain more skills (e.g. A, B, C, D, and E reimbursed certification 
expenses to workers who successfully obtained skill certificates). As a result, certain 
percentages of workers had two or more skill certificates (see Table 4). These workers 
sometimes were temporarily deployed by shopfloor managers to bottleneck processes or to 
substitute absent workers. In addition, workers were given increasing tasks and 
responsibilities in recent years, such as monitoring quality, cleaning, and maintenance. 
Through these practices, functional flexibility in these enterprises was improved to certain 
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extent. 
Finally, compared to the traditional unified “iron wage” system, wage systems in these 
enterprises had become much more flexible. For production workers, A, B, C, D, and G 
adopted piece rates, E used post wages with simultaneous consideration of skills, and F paid 
workers based on their posts and performance (see Table 4). In addition, penalties for various 
misoperation and misbehavior were widely used in these enterprises to control quality and 
strengthen labor discipline. For managerial staff of these enterprises, wages were based on 
posts and performance. However, performance pay tended to be egalitarian due to the less 
developed appraisal systems.  
In sum, functional flexibility practices were adopted by these enterprises in a piecemeal 
manner, and some were in fact extensions of traditional practices. While certain flexibility 
was achieved through multiskilling, multitasking, and wage systems, some key practices of 
functional flexibility such as teamwork and job rotation were largely missing. Moreover, as 
shown in table 4, the development of functional flexibility (in terms of the number of 
practices adopted and the percentages of workers involved) in these enterprises varied, with 
A and E ranking the highest and the lowest respectively.  
Institutional Antecedents of Extreme Numerical Flexibility 
Several institutional changes have provided important pre-conditions for the case-study 
enterprises to break away from the traditional rigid employment system and march to extreme 
numerical flexibility, which will be examined below.  
The Changing Household Registration System and Social Protection System 
An important precondition for the adoption of numerical flexibility practices is the 
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existence of a labor market, which was missing in the pre-reform era. The changing 
household registration system and social protection system have played key roles in 
promoting labor mobility and creating urban labor markets.  
The household registration system is an institution controlling population movement. 
Under this system, each individual is required to register in one and only one place of 
residence; and any change of registration requires official approval. This system was initially 
implemented in Chinese cities in 1951 and expanded to rural areas in 1955.27 While the 
original purpose of the household registration system was not to control the mobility of the 
people, the government started to strictly restrict cross region especially rural-to-urban 
migration in the 1960s, for reasons such as food shortage (Wu 1994; Zhao 2000) and the 
needs of heavy industry oriented development strategy (Chan 1994; Lin, Cai, and Li 1996). 
The effectiveness of the household registration system in suppressing rural-to-urban 
migration was further increased by the other two systems. One was the People’s Commune 
system in rural areas, which made farmers bound not only to their families but also to the 
entire rural settlements. The other was the ration system in cities, under which basic staples 
such as grain, meat, cooking oil and sugar could be bought only in state-run stores using 
ration certificates or coupons, which were distributed to local residents with an urban 
household registration. In addition, urban residents were entitled to administrative job 
allocations, the subsidized education system, welfare programs, and community cultural 
activities. All of these made internal labor mobility especially rural-to-urban migration 
extremely difficult.  
                                                        
27 See the State Council, “Guanyu jianli jingchang hukou dengji zhidu de zhishi” (Directive Concerning the 
Establishment of the Regular Household Registration System), issued on 22 June 1955. 
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After the economic reform, the Household Responsibility System replaced the collective 
production team system in rural areas leading to improved productivity, personal freedom of 
farmers, surplus labor in rural areas, and the availability of food in the urban free market. In 
addition, the ration system was abolished in all the cities by 1993. These made rural-to-urban 
migration possible. Since the 1980s, the government started to reform the household 
registration system loosening the restrictions on labor mobility. In particular, two special 
types of residential registration administered by local governments were introduced in 
Chinese cities. One was the temporary resident permit that could be issued to anyone who 
had a legitimate job or business in the city; the other was blue card issued to investors, buyers 
of property, and professionals (Liu 2005). Since the late 1990s, the government has allowed 
even greater labor mobility (Chan and Zhang 1999; Liu 2005). Specifically, the internal 
migration restrictions have been further relaxed especially for highly educated “talents” and 
skilled workers; the decade-old rural-to-urban migration quota system in all small cities and 
towns has been abolished since 2001; household registration for investments and housing 
purchases has been widely adopted nationally; and elimination of the rural/urban distinction 
in the household registration system has taken place in more and more provinces (Wang 
2004). In Xuzhou, where the case-study enterprises locate, the restrictions imposed by the 
household registration system on labor mobility have been greatly relaxed. In particular, the 
rural and urban household registration has been consolidated erasing the rural/urban 
distinction; both college graduates and graduates of technical schools can get the local 
household registration if they find local jobs; and a local household registration can be 
granted to a person as long as the following criteria are met: having a fixed place or residence; 
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having legal and stable income; and having contributed to the pension scheme for more than 
two years. Without these policies, the case-study enterprises would have been not able to use 
the various types of temporary workers the majority of which came from rural areas. My 
informal talks with some temporary workers also suggested that urban household registration 
was no longer a barrier for these workers to work in the enterprises.  
Another important institution that contributes to the formation of urban labor markets is 
the changing social protection system. China’s social protection system was established 
between 1948 and 1950, including old age pensions, health insurance, workers’ compensation, 
paid sickness leave, maternity benefits for women and many other welfare services (White 
and Shang 1996). However, due to its limited capacity, the government restricted the social 
insurance coverage to the privileged state sector leading to a fragmented social insurance 
system (Shang 1999). The key providers of social welfare were work units (or danwei), many 
of which established what became known as a mini-society with a “cradle to grave” social 
protection system (Child, 1994; Walder, 1986; Warner, 1995; West, 1999). This system on the 
one hand gave urban workers a high level of security, but on the other contributed to an 
extreme lack of labor mobility since social benefits were tied to individual enterprises 
(Howard 1991). As some researchers observed, many jobs outside the state sector, despite 
higher wages, failed to attract employees from the over-staffed SOEs since they did not want 
to give up many social protection benefits (Maurer-Fazio 1995; Smyth 1999).  
China has been reforming the enterprise-based social protection system since the 1980s, 
with the goal of establishing a unified social insurance regime which is state managed but 
places a high degree of responsibility on the individual (Whiteford 2003; Zhu and Nyland 
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2005). However, because China does not have a national social insurance law, provincial and 
municipal governments formulates local rules and individual and enterprises’ contribution 
rates based on national guidelines and local conditions (Nielsen et al. 2005). Presently, major 
elements of the new social protection system include retirement, unemployment, medical, 
industrial injury, maternity, and housing (Zheng, 2000). The system is financed jointly by 
individuals, enterprises, and government with individuals and enterprises being compelled to 
make their due contributions. All employees receive the same level of social protection 
irrespective of where they are employed, unless the base cover has been supplemented by 
their employers (Guan 2000; Wang 2001: 63). This social protection system therefore 
significantly facilitates labor mobility across enterprises especially between SOEs and 
non-state enterprises. In Xuzhou the social insurance contribution rates of individuals and 
enterprises in 2007 were as follows: pension (enterprise: 22%; individual: 8%); medical 
insurance (enterprise: 7%; individual: 2%); unemployment insurance (enterprise: 2%; 
individual: 1%); industrial injury insurance (enterprise: 1%); maternity insurance (enterprise: 
0.6%); and housing fund (enterprise: 10%; individual: 10%). Given the unified social 
insurance contribution rates and the same level of benefits, both workers and managers in my 
case-study enterprises agreed that social benefits were not a factor influencing their job 
choices.  
It is worth noting that the changing household registration system and social protection 
system has not only promoted labor mobility and the development of labor markets, but also 
increased informal employment. On the one hand, the weakening migration control has 
generated a large “floating population” in Chinese cities which is the major source of 
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informal workers. On the other hand, the household registration system retains its 
discriminatory features against the rural population and places temporary rural migrants in a 
disadvantaged position in urban labor markets (Chan 1996). For instance, although migrant 
workers with temporary resident permits can send their children to local schools, they must 
pay fees and tuitions that are substantially higher than those paid by local urban residents. In 
addition, many local governments continue to require enterprises not to hire workers without 
local household registration especially in some sectors (Liu 2005). The present social 
protection system also excludes a large number of migrant workers. Although many local 
governments have started to provide social insurance schemes for migrant workers, numerous 
problems make these efforts largely ineffective. In particular, the household registration 
system fundamentally determines that migrant workers cannot really benefit from China’s 
social protection system which follows the geographic principle (i.e. migrant workers cannot 
receive social insurance benefits once they return from the workplaces to their hometown). 
As a result, the social insurance coverage of migrant workers is very low; and many migrant 
workers withdraw their participation when they change jobs (Liu, Yu, and Liu 2006). The 
social and employment discriminations against rural population provide enterprises 
opportunities and incentives to informally employ migrant workers. Since the workers with 
temporary resident permits would not stay in one enterprise or one place for a long time and 
did not care about social insurances, some of my case-study enterprises therefore did not give 
labor contracts to these workers and some paid lower social insurances to them through labor 
dispatching. Moreover, because these workers did not enjoy equal employment rights in cities, 
they were often required to work extremely long hours and paid lower than formal urban 
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workers in all of my case-study enterprises.  
In sum, the changing household registration system and social protection system have 
contributed to the formation of labor markets in China as well as their informalization, which 
enables enterprises to pursue numerical flexibility.  
The Establishment of the Labor Contract System 
Although the use of contract labor was not new in China (Blecher 1983; Howard 1991), 
the gradual establishment of the labor contract system marked a significant departure from 
the “iron rice bowl” system. The labor contract system was firstly experimented in Shanghai 
and the special economic zones (Shenzhen and Zhuhai) in 1980 (Howard 1991; You 
1998:52). In 1983 the Ministry of Labor called for the universal introduction of the labor 
contract system; and this system officially applied to all new recruits in SOEs (except for 
university and technical school graduates and demobilized army personnel) in 1986.28 After a 
period of slow and gradual expansion, the labor contract system was finally enshrined in the 
1995 labor law and expanded to all employees in all types of enterprises. The 2008 labor 
contract law adds more details to the system, but its principles remain unchanged.  
The three major principles of the labor contract system are: (1) a written labor contract 
with detailed terms of employment (such as employment length, working time, wages, 
benefits, and the terms for changes, renewal, and cancellation of the contract) should be 
signed between the employee and the employer; (2) the contract is voluntary and renewable 
(if both parties agree); (3) the contract can be terminated by either parties (Gallagher 2005: 
                                                        
28 For details see the Ministry of Labor’s circular and “Temporary Regulations Regarding the Recruitment, 
Testing, and Selection of Workers” (February 22 1983); and the State Council’s “Temporary Regulations on the 
Use of Labor Contracts in SOEs” (1986).  
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105). While the original intention of these principles was to abolish the administrative 
assignment of lifetime employment as well as provide protections for workers, in reality the 
contractual employment enabled enterprises to pursue extreme numerical flexibility.29  
First, the labor law stipulates three types of labor contracts: fixed-term, open-ended (or 
non-fixed-term), and contracts taking the completion of a specific amount of work as a term. 
The most popular type is fixed-term contracts, which allow enterprises to make use of 
short-term employment to enhance numerical flexibility (Qiao 2008). Table 3 indicates the 
prevalence of short-term labor contracts in the case-study enterprises. In A and E, there were 
some temporary workers whose contract term was only three months or six months; and in A, 
C, and E, the majority of workers only had one year labor contracts. Although the labor 
contract system also encouraged open-ended contracts to stabilize the workforce, its 
regulations made it very difficult for workers to receive this type of contracts. According to 
the labor law (Article 20), three conditions must be met to obtain an open-ended contract: (1) 
an employee has worked for the same employer for a consecutive period of ten (or more) 
years; (2) both the employee and the employer agree to extend the term of the labor contract; 
(3) the employee must request for an open-ended contract. Since employers can either block 
the first condition by terminating the labor contracts before they reach ten years or simply 
refuse to renew the labor contracts, the conclusion rates of open-ended contracts in the 
assembly sub-plants/workshops of the case-study enterprises were very low ranging from 0 in 
B, C, and F to 16.7% in E. When asked the tactic of dealing with workers’ requests of 
open-ended contracts, the HR manager of C said: “Our method is putting off (tuo). We 
                                                        
29 This part is based on the 1995 labor law since the 2008 labor contract law had not come out when this study 
was conducted. However, the impact of the 2008 contract law on numerical flexibility will be discussed later.  
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usually let these workers wait. After some time, the workers will change their requests to 
fixed-term contracts because they are afraid that we will not renew their contracts. If some 
workers continue to request for open-ended contracts, we will let them wait until they change 
their minds.” The third type of labor contracts i.e. those taking the completion of a specific 
amount of work as a term, allows enterprises to use temporary workers. However, this type of 
temporary labor was not common in the case-study enterprises. Only a few peasant workers 
who engaged in some temporary heavy labor or dirty jobs were given such contracts.  
Second, the labor contact system allows probation periods, which provides opportunities 
for enterprises to reduce labor costs and increase numerical flexibility by hiring temporary 
workers in the name of apprentices. The labor law states that the longest probation period is 
six months (see Article 21), but in reality enterprises often extend probation periods at will. 
Moreover, probation periods are often not included in the terms of labor contracts. In the 
seven case-study enterprises, probation workers either signed special probation contracts 
rather than labor contracts or did not have any contracts at all. In addition, the labor law 
allows enterprises to dismiss probation workers without limitations, which resulted in the 
cyclic use of technical school graduates as apprenticeship labor in the case-study enterprises.  
Third, the labor law stipulates nine circumstances under which enterprises can terminate 
labor contracts, granting employers significant power and flexibility in adjusting their 
workforces. These circumstances include: agreement of termination between the parties 
involved through consultation; proved incapability of probationary workers to meet 
recruitment requirements; employees’ serious violations of enterprise rules, regulations, and 
disciplines; employees’ serious dereliction of duty or engagement in malpractice for selfish 
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ends that cause great losses to enterprises; criminal behavior; employees’ loss of capability of 
working after medical treatment for illness or injury not suffered at work; employees 
unqualified for their jobs; significant changes of the objective conditions taken as the basis 
for the conclusion of the contract; and enterprises facing serious economic difficulties or 
bankruptcy (see Article 24, 25, 26, and 27 of the 1995 labor law). Through these regulations, 
enterprise, especially POEs, IJVs, and WFIEs have gained great freedom of dismissals. A 
good example is G which terminated labor relationships with near half of its workforce in 
2004 when it faced economic difficulties. Although SOEs still face various constraints in 
terminating labor contracts, their legal power of dismissing workers provides them a 
significant leverage to gain workers’ conformity to various numerical flexibility practices 
such as internal retrenchment and extreme overtime work. The “forced” employee-proposed 
termination of labor contracts in the case-study SOEs exactly resulted from the terrifying 
effect of the enterprises’ power of firing workers. And this power also forced the workers to 
accept extreme overtime without sufficient compensation. Moreover, the labor law allows 
termination of labor contracts when they expire or the conditions for the termination as 
agreed upon by the parties involved emerge; and employers do not need to pay any 
compensation for such termination. This further increases employers’ capability of 
downsizing their workforces and encourages the use of short-term contracts.  
In sum, the labor contract system designed to provide freedom of employment choice for 
both workers and enterprises has only benefited employers and high skilled employees. The 
individual nature of labor contracts fragmentizes Chinese workers and weakens their 
bargaining power in employment relationships. Moreover, the hiring and firing autonomy of 
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enterprises granted by the labor contract system has greatly increased numerical flexibility 
and hegemonic management control in the Chinese workplace.  
The Weakening Workers’ Representation in the Workplace  
Numerical flexibility practices may be tremendously constrained by strong trade unions. 
Yet, this does not happen in contemporary China. As a socialist state, China has a highly 
developed trade union organization and the largest number of union members in the world. 
However, ideologically conceived as a mass organization of the working class led by the 
Communist Party, Chinese trade unions have failed to act independently and effectively 
protect workers’ interests. Before the economic reform, Chinese enterprise unions performed 
a variety of political and economic roles in the workplace, such as promoting production 
through labor emulation, assisting enterprise management in providing welfare services, and 
organizing workers in spare-time cultural, political, and technical studies, vocational training, 
and recreational activities (Ding, Goodall, and Warner 2002; Ng and Warner 1998). While 
unions were often criticized of their “economism” and “welfare trade unionism”, they were 
able to promote certain workers’ interests in the workplace especially under the support of the 
Party.  
China’s economic reform since the 1980s has ushered enterprise unions to a new round 
of descent (Chan 1998, 2000; Lee 1999; Zhao and Nichols 1996). In SOEs management has 
gained increasing autonomy and discretionary power over issues such as hiring, firing, wages, 
investment, and production plans. The intertwinement of the goals of the Party and 
management has further reduced unions’ influences (Gallagher 2005). In the non-state sector, 
despite the trade union law states that enterprises with over 25 employees should have unions, 
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the unionization rate is low especially in Asian invested enterprises and domestic POEs. The 
ACFTU’s (All China Federation of Trade Unions) organizing campaign since 2000 has 
significantly increased the number of enterprise unions in the non-state sector, but these 
unions are usually dominated by employers and many of them only exist on paper (Liu 2008). 
In addition, enterprise unions have gained two new functions since the 1990s, i.e. collective 
consultation and labor dispute mediation. However, the collective contracts are usually 
characterized by strong formalism (Clarke, Lee, and Li 2004; Warner and Ng 1999); and 
union mediators often stand for management with the goal of maintaining stability. In general, 
the Chinese workplace has changed from “organized dependence” to “disorganized 
despotism” (Lee 1999).  
All of the case-study enterprises had trade unions, which rather automatically signed up 
new employees when they concluded labor contracts with the enterprises. As a result, almost 
all the formal employees in these enterprises were union members. However, as Table 5 
indicates, there were only three enterprise unions (i.e. A, C, and E) that had full time union 
staff. Moreover, most union chairmen were part time; and two of them (i.e. F and G) were 
middle level managers. The significant lack of staff reflected the marginalized status of these 
enterprise unions.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
All of the seven enterprise unions were a tool of management, but they had slightly 
different functions and influences in the workplace (see table 5). First, unions in F and G 
were losing functioning and influences. Neither of them had full time staff and union offices. 
However, because Xuzhou Trade Union Federation commissioned membership fee collection 
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to Xuzhou Tax Bureau, both of the two enterprises paid their union fees in full. They also had 
special union accounts to receive the returned membership fees (60%), but the unions could 
not use the money without the general managers’ authorization. As a result, their welfare 
activities were very limited. Table 5 shows that only 15.2% of surveyed workers in F were 
satisfied with the union. As a salesman in the marketing department of F said, “Our union 
does not have any use at all.” However, although the union in G was also becoming 
marginalized, two reasons made much more surveyed workers (47.4%) satisfied with it. First, 
the majority of G’s workers did not have labor contracts (65.3%, see table 3) and thus were 
excluded from union membership and benefits. Compared to those workers, the surveyed 
workers who were formal employees might attribute their better employment conditions and 
benefits to the union. Second, the surveyed workers were very young (the average age was 24) 
and most of them came from rural areas without sufficient knowledge of unions (two of them 
did not even know what was a trade union). Since most of them could not differentiate the 
union from the management, they might be confused about their satisfaction with the union 
and the organization.  
Unions in B, C, and D seemed to be a more functional managerial tool. Although having 
few full time staff, these unions had special offices and sufficient funds within their discretion. 
The traditional enterprise union functions such as welfare, labor emulation, and democratic 
management that included organizing workers’ congresses and information sharing were still 
important parts of these unions’ daily work. In addition, these unions joined management in 
various shopfloor disciplinary inspections on issues such as attendance, work behavior, and 
cleanness. In many workers’ eyes, the major job of these unions was strengthening labor 
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discipline. As an assembly line worker in C said: “The union staff were really bad. They often 
impose fines on us. They are worse than many supervisors.” Facing with the extreme 
numerical flexibility practices such as internal retrenchment and overtime in these enterprises, 
the unions were not able to confront the management at all. Although the collective contracts 
stated that employment practices should follow the requirement of the labor, in practice 
neither the management nor the unions paid attention to these formalistic rules. The workers’ 
congresses that were held once a year in these enterprises were also characterized by strong 
formalism. As a worker in B told me: “The workers’ representatives are in fact designated by 
supervisors and managers. They always choose their favorite workers (qinxin). Those 
workers cannot represent us.” When asked the union’s attitude toward extreme overtime, the 
union chairman in D said: “We adopt a flexible approach toward overtime. The enterprise 
does not pay workers overtime compensation, but workers’ piece-rate based wages already 
increase. Managerial staff also work overtime, six or six and a half days per week, although 
there is no strict requirement on this. We SOEs emphasize ‘sacrifice’ (fengxian). The union 
should speak for workers, but we also need to consider the enterprise’s conditions. Protecting 
the enterprise’s interests is protecting workers’ fundamental interests.” Based on this logic, 
these unions’ new function i.e. labor dispute mediation was also largely meaningless for the 
workers. As admitted by the union chairmen of B, C, and D, few workers went to them for 
labor dispute mediation. Instead, the workers often directly went to the local labor arbitration 
committees. When this study was going on, there was a work stoppage in a sub-plant of D, 
because the workers there could not bear their low wages anymore given the rapidly raising 
inflation level. The union chairman went to mediate, but as the enterprise’s representative. 
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What she did was just trying to persuade the workers to consider the enterprise’ economic 
conditions and accept the low wages. According to a worker in C, “The trade union is not our 
workers’ organization at all. The union people are cadres, only speaking for the factory.”  
Unions in A and E were the “best” among the seven enterprise unions, in that they 
sometimes were able to speak for workers and that more workers were satisfied with them 
(see table 5). The union in A to a large extent kept its socialist tradition, performing all the 
standard enterprise union functions relatively well. In particular, it acted as a “transmission 
belt” between the management and workers, helping the management communicate with the 
workers and reflecting the workers’ concerns and complaints to the management. The 
workers seemed to welcome the middleman role of the union. According to the union’s own 
survey, when the workers had labor disputes, the highest percentage (34.67%) would firstly 
go to the union for mediation. When the workers’ interests were not in conflict with those of 
the enterprise, the union was even able to represent the workers against lower level managers 
and supervisors. For example, due to the malfunction of an equipment in the night shift, a 
production line did not achieve its quota. The line manager thus did not allow the workers to 
get off despite they had worked 12 hours. However, the continual work of the night shift 
workers would interrupt the day shift production since the day shift workers had already 
come to work. Therefore, after receiving the workers’ call, the union chairman decided to 
intervene. He firstly got the general manager’s support, then went to the production line in 
person, and required the line manager to let the workers get off.30 Unfortunately, for the 
numerical flexibility practices initiated or supported by the top management, the union had 
                                                        
30 Interview, the union chairman of A.  
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never been able to challenge. As the union chairman admitted, some workers went to him 
complaining the extreme overtime. But what he could do was just persuading the workers to 
work for the interests of the enterprise.  
The union in E also had certain strength. The general manager was a Singaporean 
appointed by the US parent company, who supported the union’s activities especially labor 
emulation and labor dispute mediation. The union even concluded wage agreements with the 
management, according to which the wage increase rates in 2000 and 2007 were 7% and 10% 
respectively. However, these were not negotiated rates, but unilaterally determined by the 
general manager.31  Under the support of the Chinese vice general manager and Party 
secretary, the union had spoken for several old workers whose labor contracts would be 
terminated by the general manager. As a result, these workers were allowed early retirement 
which was much better than dismissals. 32  While the union, united with the Chinese 
management, was able to play a certain role in preventing the foreign management from 
firing too many workers, it did not have a voice for most numerical flexibility practices 
including internal retrenchment and overtime.  
In general the seven enterprise unions were not able to confront the management and 
challenge the managerial labor practices. Some of them had become either useless or 
completely alienated to workers. Even in the best cases of A and E, the unions could only 
play a very weak representative role while failing to change the numerical flexibility 
practices. Thus, the weakening workers’ representation in the workplace has provided another 
precondition, i.e. management-dominated enterprise unions, for the widespread numerical 
                                                        
31 Interview, the union chairman of E.  
32 Interview, the general manager of E.  
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flexibility. 
The Ambiguous Labor Regulations and Weak Enforcement 
Legal loopholes on some numerical flexibility practices and minimum punishment of 
violating labor regulations are another two preconditions for the widespread numerical 
flexibility in the Chinese workplace. Labor regulations in China include the labor law, labor 
policies and regulations issued by the State Council and the Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security (former Ministry of Labor and Social Security), local (i.e. provincial and 
municipal) decrees issued by local People’s congresses, and local administrative rules issued 
by local governments. The labor law establishes a wide range of labor standards (with the 
major exception of freedom of association) which are comparable to many developed 
countries, but many articles are too vague or too general (Ngok 2008). The labor policies and 
regulations issued by various agencies, which are not always consistent with the labor law, 
further increase regulatory complexity and ambiguity (Cooney 2007). 33  As to labor 
regulations related to numerical flexibility practices, the following legal loopholes are 
striking.  
First, the labor law and various labor regulations do not clarify the time limit for 
employers to conclude labor contracts with new employees, which allows enterprises to 
employ workers without giving them labor contracts. Although the labor law does set up six 
months as the maximal probation period, it fails to specify detailed regulations on employers’ 
use of probation. Moreover, the labor regulations only apply to written labor contracts while 
lacking corresponding rules for de facto employment relationships, which leave workers 
                                                        
33 Legal ambiguity and loopholes are not only limited to labor regulations. In general China’s law is confusing 
in many areas and contains many gaps (Peerenboom 2002).  
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without labor contracts unprotected. The use of temporary workers without labor contracts 
and the large number of apprenticeship labor in the case study enterprises was to a large 
extent encouraged by these legal loopholes. Second, the Labor Law does not specify the 
terms and conditions of fixed-term contracts such as the scope of application, the maximum 
and minimum duration, and the maximum allowable times of renewal, thus granting 
employers great freedom in contract conclusion. In addition, there are no constraints and 
costs for the ending of short-term contracts. These legal loopholes thus contribute to the wide 
use of short-term labor contracts in the workplace, even for many permanent positions. Third, 
there are no clear and unified regulations on internal retirement especially the status and 
treatment of internal retirees. As a result, different regions, sectors, and enterprises have 
different policies which are often in favor of enterprises’ interests. An example is the loose 
and flexible internal retirement policies in the case-study enterprises that led to the large scale 
internal retirement. Fourth, the labor law and other regulations are silent on the use of 
dispatched labor. Enterprises thus view labor dispatching as an effective way to gain 
numerical flexibility and reduce labor costs while without violating the labor law. Finally, 
there is no stringent punishment for violations of the labor regulations. Although the labor 
law stipulates that labor contracts shall be concluded, it does not specify the legal 
consequences in case of violations. If employers illegally revoke labor contracts or 
deliberately delay the conclusion of labor contracts, the penalty will only be making 
corrections and compensating for any losses that may have been sustained by laborers (see 
article 98 of the labor law). In the case of extremely long working hours, employers will be 
required to cease work in excess of permitted hours. If employers refuse to comply, a fine of 
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up to RMB¥ 20,000 (about US$ 2,500) will be imposed, but no more pressure if employers 
still refuse to pay (see the 2004 Labor Inspection Regulations). The lack of or lenient 
punishment makes the costs of violating the labor law very low, thus encouraging enterprises 
to ignore any labor regulations.  
Weak enforcement further makes the labor regulations on numerical flexibility practices 
and corresponding punishment useless. The major state agencies in charge of the 
implementation of China’s labor regulations are labor bureaus at various administrative levels. 
However, both the quantity and the quality of labor inspectors in these agencies are far from 
enough to ensure labor law implementation. In Xuzhou, there were merely sixty full time 
labor inspectors in 2006 who were in charge of over 20,000 employing units and over a 
million employees. Moreover, the turnover of these labor inspectors was high; many of them 
did not have sufficient knowledge of labor regulations; and in some counties/districts of 
Xuzhou the labor inspectors only had the capacity to deal with workers’ complaints while not 
able to do any workplace inspections.34 In addition, although clear processes and rules for 
dealing with labor complaints, conducting inspections, and imposing penalties on recalcitrant 
enterprises exist at the national level (for details see the 2004 Labor Inspection Regulations), 
in practice labor inspections are heavily influenced by local governments which, often 
obsessed with economic development or having corrupt relationships with employers, tend to 
stand up for capital and suppress labor (Cooney 2007). As a result, labor inspectors often 
refrain from properly implementing the law if it may affect favored enterprises (Taylor, 
Chang, and Li 2003: 43–45). A worker in C who could not bear extreme overtime any more 
                                                        
34 An internal report of Xuzhou Labor and Social Security Bureau on labor inspections.   
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went to the Xuzhou labor bureau to complain. However, the general manager of C who was 
also a government official (because this was a large listed SOE) immediately settled it down 
by inviting the labor bureau officials for a dinner. Later, C fired this worker to warn his 
fellows.35 Even if labor inspectors do try to enforce the labor regulations, they can only 
impose penalties such as warnings, correction notices, and a small amount of fines, while 
lacking the power to seriously challenge employers (Cooney 2007).  
Another way to enforce labor regulations is making use of the labor dispute resolution 
system. However, various shortcomings and flaws exist in China’s labor dispute resolution 
system leading to its failure of ensuring effective enforcement of the labor law (Cooney 
2007).36 The most salient ones are as follows. First, the labor dispute resolution procedures 
include mediation, arbitration, and two trials. While mediation is often bypassed, labor 
dispute cases cannot be brought to courts without going through arbitration. As a result, most 
cases need two hearings, by the labor dispute resolution committees and the courts 
respectively. And some cases may need the third hearings of higher level courts. Therefore, it 
often takes a long period to reach a verdict for a labor dispute case, which cannot be afforded 
by many workers especially migrant workers. Second, complainants must initiate arbitration 
within sixty days after they know or should have known of the harm. Since it is often very 
difficult for workers to immediately realize employers’ illegal labor practices, many of them 
are in fact excluded from the legal channel of resolving labor disputes. Third, similar to the 
labor bureaus, the labor dispute arbitration committees do not have sufficient autonomy. In 
                                                        
35 Informal talks with some workers in C.  
36 This part is based on the labor dispute resolution system at the time when this study was conducted. The 
Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law which came into effect on May 1st, 2008 brings some changes to 
this system, but remains its basic principles, structure, and procedures, which will be discussed later.  
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principle these committees are tripartite autonomous bodies, but in reality they are dominated 
by representatives from the labor bureaus who are very likely to favor government and 
enterprise interests over workers (Gallagher 2005: 74). Finally, both arbitral awards and final 
verdicts of the courts may be meaningless for workers since they are often difficult to enforce 
in China (Chen 2002; Clarke 1996; Cooney 2007). Moreover, partly due to the lack of 
confidence in the legal system and partly due to the Chinese cultural tradition that 
discourages dispute resolution using a judicial approach (Fox, Donohue, and Wu 2005), 
workers only view the legal channel as their last resort to protect their interests and often do 
so after they lose their jobs or have decided to leave their enterprises. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that only a very few of workers in the case-study enterprises, less than 10 in each 
enterprise in recent two years, had brought their labor disputes to the local arbitration 
committees. According to some workers I talked to, they doubted the fairness of the courts 
and did not want to become “an open enemy of the enterprise” which would make them feel 
very unconformable to continue working there.37  
In principle trade unions are another force in strengthening labor law enforcement. 
However, as already shown in this paper, enterprise trade unions are too weak to monitor 
managerial labor practices. In short, all the three ways that may ensure the implementation 
and enforcement of labor regulations fail in contemporary China.  
To conclude, the changing household registration system and social protection system, 
the establishment of the labor contract system, the weakening workers’ representation in the 
workplace, and the ambiguous labor regulations and weak enforcement have provided a 
                                                        
37 Interviews with some workers in the case-study enterprises.  
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series of preconditions i.e. a labor market and its informalization, contractual employment, 
management-dominated enterprise unions, and loose legal environment, for Chinese 
enterprises to fare to extreme numerical flexibility.  
Institutions, Markets, and Imperatives for Extreme Numerical Flexibility 
 While increasing product market competition and greater diversity of labor markets are 
universal driving forces of numerical flexibility all over the world, several institutions in 
China, the legacies of the planned economy or culture, further increase uncertainties and 
fluctuations of product markets and worsen the labor market condition of surplus low skilled 
labor and scarce high skilled labor, pushing enterprises to adopt numerical flexibility 
practices for their survivals. The following section will examine these institutions as well as 
the imperatives they create through product and labor markets in detail.  
The Macroeconomic Control (hongguan tiaokong) of the State 
One of the key institutional characteristics of China’s statist market is heavy and 
frequent state intervention of the economy. In fact China’s economic reform is characterized 
by progressive development of market mechanism with continual functioning of the socialist 
plan-based system. While it is true that in even the most market-oriented systems 
governments use regulatory systems to foster conditions for successful markets (Fligstein 
1996; Lindblom 1977), the state intervention of market i.e. the so-called macroeconomic 
control (or macro control) in China, is far more extensive and intensive, resulting in highly 
unstable and unpredictable product markets.38 Macroeconomic control measures in China 
include monetary and fiscal policies, legal regulations, centralized economic planning, 
                                                        
38 However, the goals of macroeconomic control in China are promoting employment and economic growth, 
stabilizing price, and maintaining equilibrium of balance of payments.  
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industrial policies, and direct administrative intervention. In particular, while the Chinese 
state has started to use more and more instruments of macroeconomic policies such as interest 
rates and tax policies to indirectly intervene in the economy, direct administrative 
interventions such as direct government investments, administrative approval of projects and 
the use of land, direct credit control through the state-owned banks, and administrative 
control of market prices still play a very important role (Liu 2005a; Pang 2006). Since the 
economic reform, the Chinese state has implemented six rounds of macroeconomic control: 
1979-1981, 1985-1986, 1989-1990, the second half of 1993-1996, 1998-2002, and the second 
half of 2003-2004, each of which has significantly impacted domestic product markets 
although the degrees vary for different industries (Liu 2005b; Pang 2006; Wang 2008). 
Moreover, the six rounds of macroeconomic control have different background, nature, and 
focuses. The first four focused on inflation and aimed to tighten the economy; the fifth tried 
to control deflation by expanding domestic investment and demand; and the sixth focused on 
bank credits and land use with the goal of suppressing the rapid development of some 
industries such as steel, cement, electrolytic aluminium, and real estate while maintaining the 
development of others (Dong 2005; Liu 2005b; Pang 2006). In addition, while the first five 
rounds of macroeconomic control were reactive interventions of the state after inflation or 
deflation had emerged, the latest one was proactive response of the state before the economy 
became overheated (Wang 2008). These further make it difficult for enterprises to predict 
when and how the state will intervene in the market.  
The construction machinery industry in China is a very cyclical one. Because the 
products of Chinese construction machinery enterprises, due to their low-end nature, are 
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mainly sold in the domestic market, this industry has to heavily depend on domestic fixed 
assets investments, which makes it vulnerable to the state’s macroeconomic control (Kong 
2004). As figure 1 shows, all the six rounds of macroeconomic control have significantly 
impacted the total sales of the four major products of this industry, i.e. loaders, road rollers, 
tyre cranes, and excavators, which are also major products of the case-study enterprises C, D, 
A and B, and G respectively. While during the first four rounds of macroeconomic control 
(which aimed to tighten the economy) the sales (in terms of the number of machines) increase 
rates of these products sharply declined and often became negative, during the fifth round 
(which aimed to expand domestic investments and demands) sales of these products rapidly 
increased. In particular, the effect of the expansionary macroeconomic control during 
1998-2002 reached its peak in 2002 and 2003, leading to the “blowout” (jingpen) of the 
construction machinery product markets. The sales increase rates of the four major products 
in 2002 and 2003 were: 64.50% and 89.17% for loaders; 47.69% and 36.57% for road rollers; 
58.78% and 49.04% for tyre cranes; and 58.99% and 76.56% for excavators. And the sales 
revenue and profits of the whole industry increased 38% and 37% in 2002 and 34% and 65% 
in 2003 (Zou 2004). However, the booming markets suddenly cooled off after the state 
intensified the new round of macroeconomic control in April 2004 through measures such as 
increasing the interest rate, raising capital requirement for fixed asset investments in some 
industries, tightening approval of new projects and land use, and reducing economic 
development districts from 6866 to 2053 (Dong 2005; Tang 2006; Zou 2005). Although the 
construction machinery industry was not the target of the macroeconomic control, the rapid 
decrease or slowdown of fixed-asset investments (for example, the increase rates of fixed 
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asset investment reduced from 53% in the first two months of 2004 to 4.7% in April of 2004) 
made its product markets significantly shrunk (Wang and Li 2004). As figure 1 shows, the 
sales increase rates of the four products greatly declined in 2004 and 2005 and some even 
became negative. And such shock was particularly striking for some products in the short 
term. As indicated in figure 2, the sales of excavators and loaders immediately and sharply 
decreased after April 2004.39  
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here 
The extreme uncertainty and unpredictability of construction machinery product markets 
caused by the state’s macroeconomic control makes extreme numerical flexibility practices 
an imperative for this industry. As reported by some observers, while in the early 2000s 
workers in the construction machinery enterprises usually had to work overtime, in 2004 
many of them were dismissed or laid-off, took long leaves, shared jobs, or worked in reduced 
time (Dong 2005; Han 2004; Zhao and Li 2005). The case-study enterprises had adopted the 
same numerical flexibility practices. In 2003, the monthly overtime hours of some workers 
reached 200, over 5 times of the legal limit (which is 36 overtime hours per month); all of the 
enterprises used a large number of temporary workers; and A, B, C, and D outsourced many 
parts and components. In 2004, however, all of the enterprises tremendously reduced their 
temporary workers; both E and G dismissed over 200 formal workers accounting for 30% and 
50% of their total workforces respectively; B, C, and D reduced their formal workforces by 
forcing many employees to retire early; A, B, C, and D got some outsourced parts and 
components back to in-house production; and the workers in all of the enterprises took long 
                                                        
39 The slack season of China construction machinery industry is January and February and the peak season is 
March-June. The sales declines in the peak season further indicate the influence of macroeconomic control.  
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leaves or worked in reduced time (three or four days per week).40 Thus, not surprisingly, all 
the HR, manufacturing, and sub-plant managers of these enterprises I interviewed clearly 
identified the state’s macroeconomic control as one of the most important factors influencing 
their production and employment.  
The Underdeveloped Business Credit System 
Another key character of China’s transitional economy is the significantly 
underdeveloped business credit system. Business credit largely did not exist in China in the 
planned economy since the state directly allocated resources and intervened in enterprise 
production. Since the economic reform, product markets have gradually developed and 
market mechanism has become increasingly important in economic transactions. However, 
the business credit system is still far from established in China (Li and Wu 2003; Zhang 
2004). As a result, lack of business credit has become one of the biggest challenges for the 
long-term economic development of China (Yang 2005). According to Yuan (2003), 
economic losses caused by lack of business credit were equal to 37% of the state’s fiscal 
income. The major problems caused by lack of business credit include payment arrears, 
breach of contracts, fraud financial information, fake products, violation of intellectual 
property rights, and so on. In particular, according to a national employer survey in 2002, 
payment arrears was the most common problem of business credit (Dong 2003). It is 
estimated that the average term of Chinese enterprises’ receivables is over 120 days; 
enterprise overdue receivables account for 5% of total sales, 10 to 20 times than that of the 
developed countries; about 80% of Chinese enterprises are in “triangular debts” i.e. 
                                                        
40 Interviews with the workers, HR managers, and manufacturing managers of the seven enterprises.  
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inter-enterprise debts; and the total inter-enterprise arrears is between RMB¥ 300-400 billion 
(about US$37.5-50 billion) (Bai 2004; Dong 2003; Monaghan 2004; Yang 2005; and Yuan 
2003).  
The causes of lack of business credit in contemporary China are identified by many 
Chinese researchers (e.g. Li 2007; Li and Wu 2003; Yang 2004; Yang 2005; Yuan 2005; 
Zhang 2004), which are briefly summarized here. First, contractual relationships and legal 
traditions are missing in the traditional Chinese culture. As a result, honesty and credit are 
merely supported by moral and religion, the constraints of which have been destroyed by the 
Cultural Revolution and market-oriented economic reform. Second, China does not have any 
legislation directly related to business credit although the principle of honesty and credibility 
appears in several laws such as the civil code, the contract law, and the negotiable 
instruments law. In addition, the enforcement of the law is so weak that the cost of discredit 
behavior especially defaulting can be largely ignored. Third, there is no centralized system 
for corporate credit information in China. While several hundred credit information 
companies have been set up in recent years, they are so small and separated that it is 
impossible to form a complete and unified enterprise credit information system. Finally, local 
governments’ discredit behavior, corruption, and local protectionism further discourage or 
prevent the development of business credit. 
Despite lack of business credit in China, due to fierce product market competition, 
enterprises have increasingly used open accounts as their unique condition of payment which 
leads to serious defaults and non-payments.41 Open accounts were used by all the marketing 
                                                        
41 According to the Coface report on corporate credit risk management in China, 88% of companies interviewed 
in 2006 had over 30% of their turnover on open accounts, compared to 60% in 2005 (Lafage 2007).  
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departments of the case-study enterprises. In some enterprises which dominated the national 
markets such as A and B, high percentages of advance payments (between 70% and 100% of 
full payments) were often required. In the other enterprises, however, the percentages of 
advance payments were much lower; and there were no advance payments for many sales. As 
a result, A and B had encountered much less defaults and payment fraud than the other 
enterprises.42  Table 6 shows the ratios of accounts receivable to sales revenue of the 
case-study enterprises in 2004 and 2005. Except for A and B, the ratios of the other 
enterprises exceeded 10% indicating high financial risk.43 In addition, significant percentages 
of receivables may not be drawn back. For instance, in 2004 47.03% of accounts receivable 
of (C+D) were overdue over 3 years thus becoming “bad accounts”. Sales defaults and 
non-payments of the whole machinery industry in China were even worse. For instance, in 
2001-2006 the average ratios of accounts receivable to sales revenue of all the 130 listed 
machinery enterprises ranged from 36.14% to 45.35% (Xie, Yang, and Huang 2007).  
Insert Table 6 about here 
The existing or potential cash flow problem resulted from sales defaults and 
non-payments often make enterprises unable to obtain raw materials on time thus interrupting 
normal production. In the case-study enterprises, defaulting was the common purchasing 
practice. For some enterprises, this was due to their financial problems caused by sales 
defaults and non-payments; for others which did not have financial problems (i.e. A and B), 
this practice was preventive since lack of business credit made the potential financial risk 
high. According to the marketing manager of A, “Contracts in China are useless papers. 
                                                        
42 Interviews with the marketing managers of the case-study enterprises.  
43 Generally speaking, it is risky when the ratio of accounts receivable to sales revenue exceeds 10%. 
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Nobody wants to be the first to obey the rules.” However, the wide use of defaulting or even 
non-payments often made the supply of raw materials and parts and components unstable. As 
the purchasing manager of C said: “Our strategy is defaulting. The sales department cannot 
get money back, so we have to owe a lot of money to suppliers. Suppliers thus become 
increasingly inactive……We seldom pay suppliers in advance; and we often fail to pay them 
long time after we get their raw materials…… The responses of suppliers fall into three 
categories. The first category of suppliers will not sell products to us anymore even if we 
promise to make full payment on delivery. The second category will sell us some materials if 
we make some payment next time. The third category will continue to sell us products under 
the condition of our defaulting, but with quality discounts. Thus we have to negotiate with the 
quality control department to accept these poor quality supplies.”   
Failing to obtain raw materials on time was common in all the case-study enterprises 
although some enterprises such as A and B were relatively better off. This had significant and 
negative effects on production and employment practices of these enterprises. All the HR, 
manufacturing, and sub-plant managers of the case-study enterprises I interviewed agreed 
that one of the major causes of overtime was delayed supply of raw materials or parts and 
components. Workers thus often had to slow down or stop working when they waited for 
input materials, but work overtime when the supplies came. As the manager of the parts and 
component sub-plant of C complained to me: “We do not want workers working overtime, 
but we really have no other ways……Waiting for supplies is another major reason. We get 
the raw materials as soon as they arrive, but the supplies are still far from enough for our 
production. In principle the assembly sub-plant can produce 800-1000 loaders per month, but 
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in reality only 250-300. When workers are waiting for supplies, I ask them to do equipment 
maintenance or provide some training to them. In some cases, they also take short leaves. 
When the supplies come, however, they have to work overtime. Workers often feel frustrated 
about this.”  
In sum, lack of business credit in China leads to serious defaulting problems which 
further results in uncertainties of factor markets (i.e. raw materials and parts and component 
markets). Failing to obtain supplies from factor markets on time has become one of the 
imperatives for the use of flexible working time in the case-study enterprises.  
The Cultural Preference of Extremely Short Lead Time 
One of the key characters of Chinese culture is high uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede 
2001). When trading goods, Chinese people prefer immediate delivery to keep risks minimal. 
As the old saying goes: handing over money with one hand while receiving goods with the 
other (yishou jiaoqian, yishou jiaohuo). The cultural preference of extremely short lead time 
not only challenges enterprises’ production capacity but also increases unpredictability of 
product markets, which are evident in the construction machinery industry. The rapid 
increase of individual customers (i.e. small construction subcontractors, small business 
owners, and peasants) in recent years has further worsened the situation. As the marketing 
manager of G said: “Now the majority of our customers are peasants. We do not know when 
they will come. But when they come here, they usually bring cash and ask for immediate 
delivery. In their minds, they should get the machines as soon as they make payments, just 
like buying stuff in shopping malls. If we cannot make immediate delivery, they will go to 
other sellers. You know, the market is a buyer’s market, and there are so many big and small 
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competitors. They do not worry that they cannot get the machines immediately from other 
sellers since they have cash.” The lead time for high end products is also very short although 
the buyers are usually large enterprises or government institutions. For instance, F’s products 
mainly targeted construction projects of large SOEs or government institutions. But the 
marketing manager of F had similar complaints about short lead time: “Chinese enterprises 
do not have long term plans. When I call them to see whether they need our products in the 
near future, they say ‘Wait a while, we will discuss about it.” When I call them a month later, 
they say ‘Wait, we are still discussing about the purchase.” Then, after another month, I 
suddenly receive their call ‘We just made the decision. We need your products delivered to us 
within a week.’ My God……We really cannot predict their demands and delivery time.” 
Facing with extremely short lead time and unpredictability of product markets, all of the 
case-study enterprises had to keep sufficient manufactured inventory, as shown in table 7. 
However, similar to accounts receivables, such inventory also negatively influenced cash 
flow (especially for C, D, and G) leading to unstable supply of raw materials and flexible 
working time.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
Another way to deal with short lead time was using shift work, overtime, and temporary 
workers, which were widely found in the case-study enterprises. The story of F further 
suggests the imperatives of numerical flexibility imposed by extremely short lead time. At 
first, the German managers tried to transplant their just-in-time production and delivery 
system to F and follow the Chinese labor law in terms of employment practices. However, 
these did not work since F lost most orders. According to the marketing manager of F, “the 
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German managers could not understand the ‘time’ concept of Chinese people and the 
complete unpredictability of product markets.” Later, F had to change to the “Chinese way” 
of employment, such as two shifts work (8am-8pm and 8pm-8am), extreme overtime, and the 
use of temporary workers (including some illegal uses).44  
In sum, the cultural preference of extremely short lead time in China further increases 
unpredictability of product markets in terms of both quantity and delivery time, forcing the 
case-study enterprises to adopt extreme numerical flexibility practices.  
The Problematic Vocational Education and Training (VET) System  
The low skill levels of Chinese workers have been widely seen as one of the major 
problems for China’s development (e.g. Child 1994; Lu and Björkman 1997; Ng and Siu 
2004; and Tsang 1994). The problematic VET system has further worsened the labor market 
condition of excess low skilled labor and scarce high skilled labor.  
In the planned economy, VET in China was centrally controlled by the state and 
significantly underdeveloped. Since the economic reform, the state has tried to develop an 
all-round and multi-layered national system of VET with a focus on secondary technical 
schools. However, so far this system has not significantly changed and several deficiencies 
remain. Firstly, the lack of strategic planning and coordination makes training institutions (e.g. 
technical schools/colleges) disorganized failing to meet the market demands. In general, VET 
in China is managed by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 
and their local bureaus, but many other government departments and institutions also take 
charges. Since various administrative agencies often fail to provide unified policies, effective 
                                                        
44 Interviews with the HR and marketing managers of F.  
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coordination, and precise forecasting, the development of training institutions is uneven 
between regions, industries, and occupations leading to structural imbalance of VET. In 
addition, many technical schools are set up by large SOEs or sectoral administrative 
departments and under their direct control. These organizations do not have the expertise to 
give strategic directions on the development of the technical schools and tend to focus on 
their short-term and narrow needs of skills when making strategic planning while overlooking 
the long-term market demands (Cooke 2005b). As a result, the shortage of skilled workers is 
particularly evident in some industries such as high technology and heavy manufacturing 
industries.  
Secondly, training institutions have limited funds and insufficient supply of training staff 
in terms of both quantity and quality (Cooke 2005b). For instance, in 2005 the total funds of 
all the 2855 technical schools was RMB ¥ 4.89 billion (about US$ 0.61 billion), averagely 
only RMB ¥ 1,776 (about US$ 222) for each student. Also in 2005, there were 161,000 full 
time technical school teachers, but 97,000 were classroom teachers who were not able to 
provide practical training (China Statistics Yearbook 2006). In addition, most teachers are not 
specialized in what they teach (Cooke 2005b). As a result, many technical schools lack 
technical facilities and qualified teachers to carry out the necessary training especially 
practical training. According to a national survey in 2008, 56% technical school students 
were unsatisfied with all the basic courses; and 100% thought that curriculum reform was 
necessary and that courses should be more practical (Dai 2008). The poor quality of technical 
school training has also been widely complained by employers. As a survey in Anhui 
province shows, over 80% employers thought that the practical skills of the technical school 
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graduates were not sufficient for their posts (cf. Cooke 2005b).  
Thirdly, due to the influence of the traditional elite culture, technical schools are usually 
viewed as secondary education. In addition, technical workers are often poorly paid in China. 
According to Sun (2004), the average annual income of Chinese technical workers was 
merely between RMB ¥ 7,000-10,000 (about US$ 875-1,250). Thus, the majority of students 
go to general senior secondary schools and universities, while only some students with the 
lowest academic achievement choose technical schools. This is especially true for urban 
students. Moreover, the 2008 national survey shows that about half of the technical school 
students had no interest in learning knowledge or skills at all (Dai 2008). The poor quality of 
technical school students used to make them difficult to find jobs after graduation (Cooke 
2005b). However, given the recent shortages of labor especially skilled labor, the job market 
of technical school students has become much better. Nonetheless, technical schools still have 
recruitment problems due to the persistence of the elite culture (Li 2007).   
Fourthly, although the state has enacted a number of policies and regulations (such as 
the vocational education law, the education law, and the enterprise employee training 
regulations (1996)) to institutionalize enterprise-based training, so far such effort has been 
unsuccessful due to the weak enforcement and lack of supervision. In particular, most 
enterprises did not have sufficient training funds. While the state regulates that the minimal 
enterprise training funds should be 1.5% of total wage bills, according to a survey of the 
ACFTU, the national average was 1.37%, 1.42%, and 1.38% in 2002, 2003, and 2004 
respectively (ACFTU 2006). Moreover, a significant percentage of enterprises do not have 
any training funds at all. For instance, in 2004 390,000 medium and small sized enterprises in 
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Sichuan province (account for 99.2% of the total number of enterprises in Sichuan) did not 
have any training funds; and the 4.57 million employees of these enterprises (accounting for 
85.5% of the total employment of Sichuan) had not receive any form of enterprise training at 
all (ACFTU 2006). Even in the enterprises that have sufficient training funds, training is 
often nominal with an extremely small part of funds used in workers’ skill training. The 
ACFTU’s survey shows that, in Hangzhou one of the most economically developed cities in 
China, while 43.3% of the enterprises did not have training funds, in those that had only 12% 
were used for first front workers’ skill training (ACFTU 2006).  
Finally, the majority of the migrant workers, the major part of the Chinese workforce, 
are excluded from the VET system. The state has realized this problem and started to provide 
vocational training to migrant workers. In 2003 the state made an ambitious plan to provide 
pre-employment vocational training for 10 million migrant workers and skill training for 50 
million migrant workers who are already employed by 2005. However, according to the 
Research office of the State Council, by the end of 2005, 20% of the rural labor force had 
received short-term vocational training; 3.4% had received elementary vocational training; 
0.13% had received intermediate vocational training, and 76.4% had not received any 
vocational training at all (Guo 2006).  
The problematic VET system has further worsened skill shortage in China’s labor 
market. It is estimated that only one third of Chinese workers are skilled workers; and among 
the skilled workers most only have elementary and intermediate level skills while advanced 
skilled workers and technicians merely account for 4% (Liu 2008).45 According to the labor 
                                                        
45 There are five grades of vocational certification and qualifications in China: elementary skilled workers, 
intermediate skilled workers, advanced skilled workers, technicians, and senior technicians.  
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market data of 121 cities in 2006, the ratios of job openings to job seekers for skilled workers 
were as follows: 1.37 for elementary skilled workers, 1.55 for intermediate skilled workers, 
1.76 for advanced skilled workers, 1.96 for technicians, and 2.03 for senior technicians. In 
addition, there were 7.69 million job seekers who did not have any technical grades or 
occupational certificates, accounting for 50.4% of the total job seekers (Ministry of Labor 
and Social Security 2007). The supply of skilled heavy machinery workers in Xuzhou is 
much better than the national average since Xuzhou is a traditional heavy industry base and 
there are several machinery technical schools with a large one specializing in construction 
machinery. In addition, all the case-study enterprise had training funds ranging from 1.5% to 
4% of their total wages bills, which allowed them to provide certain skill training to the 
workers although most funds were used in managerial training.46 Even so, workers’ skills 
were still very low in these enterprises. As table 8 shows, the majority of the production 
workers in these enterprises at most had intermediate skills; and the percentages of advanced 
skilled workers and technicians were very low especially in F and G.     
Insert Table 8 about here 
The low skill levels of the workers especially those technical school graduates who 
usually had intermediate skill certificates were a common complaint of the manufacturing 
and sub-plant managers of these enterprises. As a sub-plant manager of A complained, “those 
technical school graduates do not even know the tools nor are they able to read technical 
drawings.” Another sub-plant manager of C said: “In recent years all of our new workers are 
technical school graduates. They have had little practical training in schools. After one year 
                                                        
46 Interviews with the HR managers of the case-study enterprises.  
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on-the-job training, many of them are still not able to operate independently…… In general, 
the new workers’ skills are lower than old workers.” The low skill levels of the workers also 
contributed to the wide spread of some numerical practices such as overtime and the use of 
temporary labor while prevented the adoption of some functional flexibility practices such as 
teamwork and employee participation. The manufacturing manager of A was interested in the 
Western high performance work systems. However, he said: “We know that teamwork and 
high participation is a better way, but they require much higher skills which our workers do 
not have.” When asked about the reasons of overtime, a sub-plant manager of D said: 
“……Another reason is the workers’ low skills. Many workers cannot finish their tasks on 
time because of their low efficiency. Moreover, the quality of their products is low. When the 
products fail to pass the quality inspection, the workers have to rework on them. It wastes a 
lot of time. But most quality problems, about 70%, are the problems of parts and components. 
The workers’ skill levels of those suppliers are even lower.” On the reasons for the use of 
temporary workers, the manufacturing manager of F said: “……In addition, if our workers 
had the similar skills of German workers, we would not have used so many temporary 
workers. German enterprises depend on the quality of workers; we depend on quantity. 
Anyway, China has enough people.” 
In sum, China’s VET system remains problematic, which contributes to the low skills of 
Chinese workers and thus makes some numerical flexibility practices necessary in the 
workplace.  
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Conclusion 
The Chinese industrial workplace has been marching to numerical flexibility with 
Chinese characteristics. While this study only shows a picture of the construction machinery 
industry, studies in different industries, regions, and enterprises with different ownerships (e.g. 
Benson et al. 2000; Chan 2001; Cooke 2005a; Gallagher 2005; Zhang 2008; Zhao and 
Nichols 1996) generally support the thesis of convergence toward extreme numerical 
flexibility. Institutions have played an important role in pushing such convergence, by 
directly providing preconditions including a labor market and its informalization, contractual 
employment, management-dominated enterprise unions, and loose legal environment, and 
indirectly imposing imperatives through influencing product and labor markets. Again, while 
the evidences in this study mainly come from the construction machinery industry, the 
institutions i.e. the changing household registration system and the social protection system, 
the labor contract system, the weakening workers’ representation in the workplace, and the 
ambiguous labor regulations and weak enforcement provide similar preconditions of extreme 
numerical flexibility for other industries. Although the impacts of the state’s macroeconomic 
control, the underdeveloped business credit system, the cultural preference of extremely short 
lead time, and the problematic VET system on product and labor markets vary for different 
industries, the imperatives of numerical flexibility imposed by these institutions more or less 
exist for all of the Chinese industries. However, the institutions discussed here may not be 
inclusive. In particular, China’s statist market economy has some industry specific institutions 
which need to be studied in future research.  
The labor contract law that came into effect on January 1, 2008 has certain impacts on 
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numerical flexibility. On the one hand, the new law imposes restrictions on some numerical 
flexibility practices especially illegal ones. First, some illegal uses of temporary workers i.e. 
not giving labor contracts to temporary workers and extending probation periods of technical 
school graduates, are subject to penalties. This may reduce the large number of de facto labor 
relationships. Second, open-ended labor contracts are encouraged. After two renewals of 
fixed-term contracts, open-ended contracts should be given. In addition, employers also need 
to pay compensation to workers if they do not renew labor contracts, which makes the use of 
short-term contracts less cost-efficient. Third, the 1995 labor law states that a labor contract 
terminates upon emergence of the conditions for the termination as agreed upon by the parties 
involved (Article 23), which provides employers an opportunity to abuse the termination 
conditions to dismiss workers. In the new law, this practice is not allowed anymore.  
On the other hand, however, the new law is still silent on some numerical flexibility 
practices such as the use of internship technical school students and various internal 
retrenchment practices. In addition, compared to the 1995 labor law, the new law does not 
have stricter regulations on extreme overtime. More importantly, the new law even 
encourages certain numerical flexibility practices. First, although the new law states that 
dispatched labor shall generally be used for temporary, auxiliary or substitute job positions 
(Article 66), the national implementation details enacted in September 2008 intentionally 
make this regulation ambiguous due to the concern of increasing unemployment. As a result, 
there are few restrictions on the use of dispatched labor except that the term of labor dispatch 
contracts should be at least two years. In fact, the number of dispatched labor in China 
sharply increased from 20 million before the enactment of the labor contract law in June 2007 
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to 27 million at the end of 2007 (Chen 2008). Second, while the stricter requirements for 
open-ended contracts benefit skilled workers and other core employees, they make low 
skilled workers more vulnerable to short-term contracts. My field research in Beijing, 
Shanghai, Hangzhou, Shenzhen, and Changchun in the summer of 2008 found that 
enterprises were still giving short-term (2 years or 3 years) contracts to all of the new workers 
and planned not to renew contracts with those who were not competent. In addition, to avoid 
open-ended contracts, enterprises may dismiss workers before they are eligible, which, 
according to many news reports in China, had happened before the new law took effect. 
Finally, the new law relaxes the conditions for employers to terminate labor contracts (from 
nine conditions in the 1995 labor law to fourteen conditions). In particular, in addition to 
circumstances previously specified in the 1995 labor law, i.e. employers are on the verge of 
bankruptcy, undergoing internal overhaul or encountering serious difficulties in production 
and business operation, enterprises are also able to retrench their workforces when they 
switch production, introduce major technological innovations or revise their business models 
and when other major changes occur in the objective economic circumstances on which the 
labor contracts are based rendering them non-performable (see Article 41). Moreover, the 
new law also relaxes the procedure requirement of dismissals. Only when retrenching over 20 
employees or over 10% of the workforce is an employer required to explain the 
circumstances to its trade union or to all of its employees 30 days in advance, consider the 
opinions of the union or the employees, and subsequently report the workforce reduction plan 
to the labor administration department (see Article 41). However, according to the 1995 labor 
law, any reductions of employees should follow this procedure. The new article thus further 
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reduces the check and balance role of trade unions on dismissals.  
Another important labor regulation that came into effect on May 1, 2008 is the labor 
dispute mediation and arbitration law. This law strengthens labor protection by: (1) 
increasing the role of mediation so that in some cases employees do not need to go through 
the required arbitration; (2) making some arbitral awards (i.e. those arising from disputes 
over small amount of compensation or working time, rest and holidays, and social insurances) 
final and binding to shorten the dispute resolution process; (3) extending scope of arbitrable 
matters to cover nearly all labor-related disputes; (4) extending the time limit for filing an 
arbitration case from 60 days to one year; (5) abolishing charge of arbitration fees; (6) putting 
heavier burden of proof on employers; (7) reducing arbitration hearing and award-making 
period from 97 to 60 days; and (8) clarifying jurisdiction of labor arbitration committees. 
However, this law does not significantly change the bewildering labor dispute resolution 
system that often fails to effectively protect workers’ legal rights. In particular, most dispute 
cases still need to go through the long arbitration and litigation process. Although the law 
requires arbitral rewards be made within 60 days of the acceptance of the arbitration 
application, the ill-equipped arbitration committees do no have the capacity to meet this 
requirement. As a result, in the summer of 2008, many hearings of labor arbitration cases in 
cities such as Shenzhen and Shanghai were scheduled till the end of 2008 or even 2009.47 In 
addition, the law does not increase the arbitration committees’ autonomy; nor does it have 
better ways to improve the enforcement of arbitral awards and court verdicts.  
All in all, although the labor law reform in 2008 imposes restrictions on certain 
                                                        
47 Interviews with some officials of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and the local labor 
bureaus in Shenzhen and Shanghai. 
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numerical flexibility practices especially illegal ones, the new laws do not significantly 
change the preconditions of numerical flexibility i.e. the contractual employment and loose 
legal environment. Therefore, increasing convergence of workplace employment practices 
toward numerical flexibility with Chinese characteristics is expected in the near future.     
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Table 1: Profiles of Case-Study Enterprises  
 
Enterprise Ownership Founded Time Major Products Employment 
e Turnover e 
(US$1,000) 
Profit e 
(US$1,000)
A SOE 1953 Cranes 3,276 343,890 26,554 
B SOE 2002 Truck-Mounted Cranes 358 14,038 65 
C Listed SOEa 1949 
Loading 
Machinery 1,485 189,403 -5,310 
D Listed SOEa 1948 
Road building 
and 
Compaction 
Machinery 
2,172 196,141 -10,630 
E IJVb 1958 Axle 714 63,384 2,303 
F WFIEc 1996 Concrete Machinery 158 49,383 -400 
G POEd 1992 Excavators 247 17,441 251 
Notes:  
a. C and D were affiliated to a state shareholding company listed in Shenzhen Stock Market 
in 1996. 
b. E was a SOE before it became a joint venture with a US auto parts company in 1996.  
c. F was founded as a Sino-Germany joint venture in 1996 and became a wholly 
German-owned enterprise in 2005.  
d. G was a SOE before it was privatized in 2001. 
e. Internal statistics of these enterprises at the end of 2005.  
 
 
Table 2: Retrenchment in Case-Study Enterprises (2006) 
 
 A B C D E F G 
Termination of labor relationships (%)  1.1 2.1 1.6 0.4 4.3 6.6 7.4 
Layoffs (accumulated, %) 2.4 1.9 0.7 1.3 0 0 0 
Employees waiting for posts in the 
labor-pool (%) 0 0 1.4 3.4 NA NA NA 
Early retirees (accumulated, %) 3.2 23.6 27.1 36.4 8.1 0 2.3 
Total employment 3683 478 1403 2061 704 287 310 
Sources: Enterprises’ internal statistics.  
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Table 3: Numerical Flexibility in the Assembly Sub-plants/Workshops of Case-Study 
Enterprises 
 
Numerical Flexibility A B C D E F G 
Workers without contracts & dispatched 
workers (%)a  0 0 9.5 0 6.1 24.9 5.1 
Apprenticeship workers (%)a 4.7 15 15.2 3.3 5.6 6.1 52.6 
Interns from technical schools (%)a 16.7 8.7 6.3 2.9 4.4 4.3 7.6 
Three year (or less) labor contract (%) 80 38.5 86.8 27.5 56.7 96.6 77.8 
Experience of laid-off (%) 2.3 5.0 17.4 0 38.7 3.1 15.8 
Shift work (%) 11.9 92.5 97.8 80.4 83.9 75.8 31.6 
Ave. overtime (hours/month) 43.2 72.2 71.4 25.6 46.8 42.7 50.2 
Ave. overtime, peak (hours/month) 56.7 99.6 110.3 62.7 65.6 65.2 86.3 
Job sharing (%) 39.5 45.0 23.9 69.4 20.0 42.4 50.0 
Working in reduced time (%) 23.3 25.6 45.7 58.8 41.4 27.3 70.6 
Notes: Calculations are based on worker surveys except for a, which are calculated from 
interviews with sub-plant/workshop managers.   
 
 
 
Table 4: Functional Flexibility in the Assembly Sub-plants/Workshops of Case-Study 
Enterprises 
 
Functional Flexibility A B C D E F G 
QC or other off-line teams (%) 55.8 32.5 23.9 17.6 38.7 3.0 0 
Work in multiple sites (%) 30.2 2.6 10.8 16.3 16.2 12.1 5.3 
Multiple tasks/responsibilities (%) 41.9 13.5 19.6 22.4 33.3 6.0 31.6 
Two or more skills (%) 51.2 35.0 35.6 37.3 18.8 33.3 26.3 
Teamwork a  some no no no no no no 
Job rotation a some no no no some no  no 
pay a  piece rates 
piece 
rates 
piece 
rates 
piece 
rates 
post + 
skill 
post + 
annual 
bonus
piece 
rates 
Notes: The data come from worker surveys except for a, which are based on interviews with 
sub-plant/workshop managers).   
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Table 5: Trade Unions in the Case-Study Enterprises 
 A B C D E F G 
Status of union chairman
full time, vice 
general 
manager 
treatment 
part time, 
party 
secretary 
full time, vice 
general 
manager 
treatment 
part time, 
party 
secretary 
part time, vice 
party secretary 
part time, 
finance 
manager
part time, 
HR 
manager
No. of full time staff 5 0 1 0 2 0 0 
Welfare and entertainment yes yes yes yes yes, focus limited limited
Labor emulation yes yes yes, focus yes, focus yes no no 
Disciplinary inspection yes, focus yes yes, focus yes, focus no no no 
Workers' congress 
once a year, 
focus 
once a year once a year once a year once a year no no 
Information sharing yes, focus no yes yes yes, limited no no 
Collective contract every 3 years every 3 years every 3 years every 3 years every 3 years no no 
Wage agreement no no no no yes no no 
Labor dispute mediation yes limited very limited very limited yes no no 
Representing workers' 
interests 
to certain 
extent 
no no no 
to certain 
extent 
no no 
Workers satisfied with 
unions (%) 
48.9 27.5 23.9 26.0 40.6 15.2 47.4 
Sources: Interviews with enterprise union officials and workers’ surveys. 
 
Table 6: Accounts Receivable of the Case-Study Enterprises: 2004-2005 
 
2004 2005 
Enterprise 
Sales Revenue Receivables Ratio (%) Sales Revenue Receivables Ratio (%)
A 398071 21735 5.46 420743 20043 4.76 
B 15885 748 4.71 11231 679 6.05 
C + D a 377094 35706 9.47 308435 71067 23.04 
E 61089 10289 16.84 52394 11177 21.33 
F 42633 18111 42.48 20249 12641 62.43 
G 6841 2232 32.63 NA NA NA 
Source: Financial departments of the case-study enterprises. 
Note: a. I only have combined data for C and D which formed a parent company. 
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Table 7: Manufactured Inventory of the Case-Study Enterprises: 2004-2005 
 
2004 2005 
Enterprise 
Sales Revenue Manufactured Inventory Ratio (%) Sales Revenue Manufactured Inventory Ratio (%)
A 398071 21411 5.38 420743 28506 6.78 
B 15885 679 4.27 11231 751 6.69 
C + D 377094 85358 22.64 308435 74431 24.13 
E 61089 1265 2.07 52394 1227 2.34 
F 42633 2187 5.13 20249 1393 6.88 
G 6841 2295 33.55 NA NA NA 
Source: financial departments of the case-study enterprises. 
Note: a. I only have combined data for C and D which formed a parent company. 
 
Table 8: Skills of Production Workers of the Case-Study Enterprises (June 2007) 
 A B C D E F G 
Elementary skilled workers and 
workers without grades (%) 22.64 41.12 24.52 31.08 56.13 52.17 50.48 
Intermediate skilled workers (%) 61.13 45.69 50.88 57.28 30.52  42.75 47.62 
Advanced skilled workers (%) 13.36 12.18 20.75 10.19 10.90  3.62 1.27 
Technicians (%) 2.77 1.02 3.77 1.46 2.45 1.45 0.64 
Senior technicians (%) 0.09 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 
Total production workers 2133 197 1301 756 367 138 157 
Source: Human resource departments of the case-study enterprises.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68
Figure 1: Sales Increases (%) of Four Major Construction Machinery Products: 1979-2005 
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Source: China Construction Machinery Industry Yearbook (2006) and Shi and Xu (2004).  
 
Figure 2: Sales of Excavators and Loaders: February-June 2004 
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